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EMPIRICAL FALLACIES OF EVIDENCE LAW: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT THE ADMISSION OF PRIOR SEX CRIMES
Tamara Rice Lave∗ & Aviva Orenstein∗∗

In a significant break with traditional evidence rules and policies,
Federal Rules of Evidence 413–414 allow jurors to use the accused’s
prior sexual misconduct as evidence of character and propensity to
commit the sex crime charged. As reflected in their legislative history,
these propensity rules rest on the assumption that sexual predators
represent a small number of highly deviant and recidivistic offenders.
This view of who commits sex crimes justified the passage of the sexcrime propensity rules and continues to influence their continuing
adoption among the states and the way courts assess such evidence
under Rule 403. In depending on this image of sex crime perpetrators,
legislators and judges have ignored the contrary psychological and
criminological evidence. Most critiques of the sex-propensity rules
concentrate on the unfairness part of the Rule 403 equation, but we
approach them in a novel way, focusing instead on the absence of
empirical support for their so-called probative value. This Article
examines the empirical support for the probative value of such evidence,
revealing that current policy rests on bogus psychology and false
empirical assertions. Rules 413–414 typify the regrettable seat-of-thepants psychologizing on which evidence rule drafters rely too often; the
approach eschews a nuanced approach to questions of recidivism and
the different types of sex offenders. We argue that rulemakers should
look to the disciplines engaged in the empirical study of perpetrator
behavior before asserting notions of deviance and recidivism to justify
radical changes to evidence law. Finally, we offer specific guidance to
judges about how to conceptualize the probative value of evidence of
prior sexual misconduct and how to incorporate this knowledge in
applying their discretion in admitting sex-crime propensity evidence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Presume not that I am the thing I was,
For God doth know, so shall the world perceive,
That I have turn’d away my former self
William Shakespeare, King Henry IV, Part 21
The sexual propensity rules assume that sex-crime perpetrators are
not only recidivists, but particularly aberrational, singularly dangerous,
and essentially incapable of being rehabilitated. The perpetrators’
presumed inability to control their deviant desires makes them seem
more animal than human. Irrespective of their age, their type of victim,
or the amount of time they have stayed out of trouble, sex offenders
remain perpetually menacing. As such, the thinking goes, they deserve
to be treated differently and more harshly under the law, and different
rules of evidence are justified.
Yet, what if the above claims are false? What if sex offenders are not
necessarily the compulsive offenders that politicians and the general
public believe them to be? This paper refutes the assumptions about the
nature of perpetrators and examines the effect of those assumptions on
the creation and application of evidence law. Rather than merely
presuppose that sex crime perpetrators are sick individuals who are
driven to commit and recommit the same horrific crimes, we turn to
scientific studies to learn what the research actually indicates.
Part II begins by discussing the history and traditional justifications
for Rules 413–414. Part III focuses on the widespread assumption by
rulemakers and judges that prior sex crimes are particularly probative
for determining guilt. Part IV demonstrates that the psychological and
criminological research on sex offenders does not support the high
probative value assigned to prior bad acts in sex cases. It focuses in
particular on recidivism, the effect of age on dangerousness, and the
risks that different types of offenders pose. It concludes that the
overbroad propensity rules are not justified by the empirical data. Part
V discusses the ability to predict dangerousness and asserts that based
on the accused’s prior sex crimes alone, judges and juries cannot
effectively determine whether an accused offender is likely to reoffend.
Although we disapprove of Rules 413–414 on many grounds, we are
realistic that these rules and their state law analogs are here to stay. As
such, Part VI offers specific advice to judges regarding how, particularly
in close cases and when the prior bad acts occurred long ago, judges

1. William Shakespeare, The Second Part of King Henry IV, act 5, sc. v.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/1

2

Lave and Orenstein: Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admis

2013]

EMPIRICAL FALLACIES OF EVIDENCE LAW

797

should use their broad discretion when admitting such propensity
evidence.
II. SEXUAL PROPENSITY RULES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Traditional Rule Against Character Evidence
The traditional Anglo-American rule prohibits circumstantial use of
character evidence, known as “propensity” evidence, whereby evidence
of a person’s particular characteristic or trait is offered to argue that the
person acted in conformity with that trait or characteristic.2 For
example, the prosecution cannot use evidence that the accused is an
alcoholic to argue that she probably drove drunk on a particular
occasion. In the same vein, specific-act evidence that the accused had a
prior conviction for driving while intoxicated would also be
inadmissible to prove the accused’s propensity to drink and drive.3
With the exception of questioning a witness’ character for honesty,
the rule against using character evidence to prove behavior on a
particular occasion is absolute in civil cases.4 In criminal cases,
however, discrete exceptions have arisen where the accused may choose
to assert his own good character or the bad character of the victim (and
the prosecutor may rebut the same).5
Similarly, Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts to prove propensity. It also clarifies, however, that specific acts can
be admitted for other legitimate, non-propensity purposes, even when
those acts may have some character overtones. Rule 404(b) provides
examples of use of specific-act evidence, such as evidence proving
knowledge, motive, intent, or plan. Such evidence is permissible
because it is not offered to prove propensity, but rather is independently
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) provides in pertinent part: “Evidence of a person’s character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or
trait.”
3. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.”
4. Exceptions to the propensity rule exist for impeaching witnesses in both civil and criminal
cases. In questioning witnesses or challenging their credibility generally, evidence may be adduced that
focuses on the character for truthfulness of the witness. See FED. R. EVID. 608. Rule 609 governs
impeachment of witnesses with prior convictions. Very rarely is character itself an issue (such as the
defense of truth in a defamation case) and then character is offered not for propensity but as an element
of the case. See FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
5. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Even where admissible, such character evidence is only provable
through reputation or opinion evidence, which tends to be very general, and not through evidence of
specific acts that would illustrate the propensity. On cross examination, character witnesses may be
asked about specific instances, but only to test the witnesses’ knowledge or to question their judgment,
not to prove something about the character in question. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
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relevant for another legitimate purpose.6
Traditionally, character evidence has been deemed objectionable
because it is tangential, unfairly prejudicial, and unreliable. Objections
arise from psychological questions surrounding the reliability of
character evidence, particularly the way such evidence is generated in a
courtroom.7 People are not predictable characters and so psychologists
question whether we can reliably determine how someone behaved on
one particular occasion by reviewing the person’s past deeds.8
Even if past deeds or proclivities of character are logically relevant,
character evidence is still objectionable because whatever little
probative value it possesses may be outweighed by the dangers of unfair
distraction, prejudice, or confusion. Character evidence is often only
minimally related to the trial issues but is nonetheless diverting—the
jury may become bogged down in the proof of character and become
confused regarding the issues in the case.9 The character ban also
reflects the concern that the jury may misuse the evidence by
overvaluing its persuasiveness. They will take what is essentially a
weak circumstantial argument—“he did it once, he probably did it
again,” or “he’s the type of person who would do such a thing”—and
prove too much with it.10 Finally, and most importantly, jurors may be
6. ROGER PARK, DAVID LEONARD, AVIVA A. ORENSTEIN & STEPHEN GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE
LAW : A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 162 (3d ed.
2011). The examples listed in 404(b) are not exhaustive. See id. (“The list of purposes for which other
crimes may be offered is a time-honored (though non-exclusive) one.”); see generally EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984). Courts and prosecutors have been quite
creative in articulating non-propensity reasons for admitting evidence under 404(b). See supra note 4.
7. For an assessment of the psychological value of character evidence, see Miguel Angel
Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of
Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003, 1044–59 (1984). See also David P. Bryden &
Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 561–62 (1994);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform
Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741 (2008); David P.
Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 42–45 (1986).
8. See generally Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 511–33 (1991).
9. If the trait or other similar act is contested, much valuable court time can be frittered away
proving the character question. Therefore, administrative concerns about the waste of time and the
cumulative nature of character evidence also contribute to the general disfavor of character evidence.
This concern echoes the principles of Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice, capacity to distract or confuse,
or its potential to waste time. FED. R. EVID. 403.
10. “The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal . . . is to give excessive weight to the
vicious record of crime . . . .” 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194 (3d ed. 1940). The worry is that jurors will be
overly swayed by prior similar acts and that jurors’ reasoning facilities will be clouded. In Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), Justice Jackson explained:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow
resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to
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outraged by the conduct or trait. They may grow to detest the accused
or unconsciously desire to punish the person about whom the character
evidence is offered to make him pay for previous misconduct.11 Jurors
who feel this way might ignore the standard of proof or at least fret less
over reasonable doubt. Whereas they might have agonized over the
possibility of convicting an innocent person, hearing that the accused
committed similar bad acts might make jurors less cautious.12 At the
very least, jurors’ consciences are eased because they know that the
defendant is not a blameless character.
B. Current Sexual Propensity Rules in Federal Courts and the States
1. Federal Rules of Evidence 413–414
Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415 allow the prosecutor to introduce
the accused’s prior similar acts in rape and child molestation cases.13
They provide that in criminal cases of sexual assault, “the court may
admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault.
The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”14
This means that past instances may be used to make the generally
establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a
presumption of good character . . . but it simply closes the whole matter of character,
disposition and reputation on the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The State may not show
defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his
neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity
a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its
disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Id. at 475–76 (citations and footnotes omitted).
11. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (discussing “improper
grounds” for juror decision making, including “generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as
calling for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily)”) (quoting
States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1982)); Moccia, 681 F.2d at 63 (“Although . . . ‘propensity
evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that,
uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a
prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”).
12. See D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 326 (1989) (describing
“diminished regret about possible error in a determination of guilt when the fact finder learns that the
accused is an ‘evil person’”).
13. FED. R. EVID. 413; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). We discuss only Rules 413–414, the criminal rules, and do not address
Rule 415, which deals with sexual propensity in civil cases.
14. FED. R. EVID. 413–414; § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796.
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forbidden propensity argument that if the accused raped a woman once
before, he has the character of a rapist and probably committed the rape
charged.15 The evidence adduced has to pass the Huddleston standard,16
under which a judge must find that the jury could believe that the
uncharged misconduct occurred.17 There is no time limit on when the
prior bad act took place.18 Scholars agree that admission of such priorbad-acts evidence increases conviction rates.19
2. State Adoptions of Analogous Rules
Since 1995, twelve states—Alaska,20 Arizona,21 California,22
Florida,23 Georgia,24 Illinois,25 Kansas,26 Louisiana,27 Michigan,28

15. The proposed rules do not admit all character evidence or all arguably relevant specific
wrongs, but are limited instead to evidence of the same type of criminal offenses as those with which the
accused is formally charged. Rules 413–414 also include a notice requirement. The prosecutor must
disclose in advance any evidence of the uncharged offenses to the defendant, including statements of
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that will be offered. A related approach rests
on the doctrine of chances, which posits that it is inherently improbable that a person whose prior acts
show that he is in fact a rapist or a child molester would have the bad luck to later be accused falsely of
the same type of crime unless he was truly guilty. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, An
Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character
Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 433 (2006). As a
strictly statistical proposition, what are the chances various separate victims independently made the
same false allegation? We note that false accusations would more likely involve someone who already
is known to have committed a prior act of sexual misbehavior.
16. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
17. Id. at 690; see also United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying
Huddleston to Rule 413).
18. “No time limit is imposed on the uncharged offenses for which evidence may be admitted; as
a practical matter, evidence of other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly
admitted, notwithstanding very substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or offenses.”
140 CONG. REC. 23603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Molinari) (citations omitted); see
also 137 CONG. REC. 3242 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (similar points in Senate sponsors’ statement).
19. See Miguel A. Mendez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California
Supreme Court’s About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged
Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 474 (1995) (citing various studies and empirical evidence that
jurors are highly persuaded by evidence of the accused immoral conduct).
20. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)–(3).
21. ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c).
22. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2003). California has a special jury instruction, CALJIC No.
2.50.01. If the jury finds that the accused committed a prior sexual offense, it may (but is not required
to) infer that the accused has a disposition to commit sexual offenses. A prior offense is not sufficient
by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the charged crimes. Any
inference was simply one item for the jury to consider along with all the other evidence. People v.
Burch, 2012 WL 1859669 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b)–(c) (West 2011).
24. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-4-413 (2013). Georgia added Rules 413–414 by adopting the Federal
Rules of Evidence in toto. See Joy Lukachick, Georgia Bill Alters Rules on Evidence, TIMES FREE
PRESS (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2010/dec/26/georgia-bill-alters-rules-onevidence/.
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Nebraska,29 Texas,30 and Utah31—have adopted statutes similar to Rules
413 and 414. Of the states that have passed special statutes, some
(Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Michigan, and Texas) have
limited their attention to child victims of sexual abuse. A few states
(Florida, Nebraska, and Illinois) also impose the higher burden of clear
and convincing evidence for demonstrating that the uncharged
misconduct occurred.32 Some students and scholars have advocated for
other states to jump on the bandwagon and add propensity rules for sex
Five states—Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and
crime.33
Washington—passed similar legislation, but their Supreme Courts
rejected the rules as unconstitutional.34
25. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 2011).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5502 (2011).
27. LSA-C.E.Art 412.2 (West 2004).
28. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7668.27a (West 2004).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-412 (2010) (explicitly mandating Rule 403 balancing, requiring clear
and convincing evidence that the accused actually committed the prior act or acts of sexual assault); See
also John Matson, Huskers Jump on Congress’s Fumble: Nebraska Rules of Evidence 413–15 Correct
the Facial Deficiencies of Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV 277 (discussing
the 2010 change to Nebraska law adopting a version of the federal propensity rules).
30. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
31. UTAH R. EVID. 404(c).
32. Uncharged misconduct is a term of art. In fact, such conduct may have been charged in the
past, but the other wrongs crimes or acts denoted as uncharged misconduct are not the subject of a
criminal charge for which they are being offered as propensity evidence. See generally IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 6.
33. See, e.g., William E. Marcantel, Note, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as Propensity Evidence, 74 MO. L. REV. 211
(2009) (criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court for striking down legislative attempts to adopt state rules
similar to Rules 413–414); Jessica D. Kahn, Note, He Said, She Said, She Said: Why Pennsylvania
Should Adopt Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 52 VILL. L. REV. 641 (2007); Joyce R. Lombardi,
Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are Different: Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 that Permit Propensity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s
Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103 (2004); Michelle Harper Lawson, Note, Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414: A Guide for Massachusetts Evidentiary Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1175
(2004); Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 515 (1995) (advocating that Rhode Island adopt Rules 413–15).
34. See State v. Gresham, 269 P.3d 207, 210 (Wash. 2012) (“[B]ecause RCW 10.58.090 [an
analog to Rules 413–414] irreconcilably conflicts with ER 404(b) and governs a procedural matter, we
hold that its enactment violates the separation of powers doctrine and that the statute is, accordingly,
unconstitutional.”); State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 768 (Iowa 2010) (“Based on Iowa’s history and the
legal reasoning for prohibiting admission of propensity evidence out of fundamental conceptions of
fairness, we hold the Iowa Constitution prohibits admission of prior bad acts evidence based solely on
general propensity.”); State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607–08 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (striking down
section 566.025 of the Missouri Revised Statutes as violating the Missouri Constitution and the court’s
prohibition against propensity evidence) (“Missouri constitution prohibits the admission of previous
criminal acts as evidence of a defendant’s propensity . . . . Evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts,
when admitted purely to demonstrate the defendant’s criminal propensity, violates one of the
constitutional protections vital to the integrity of our criminal justice system.”). Similarly, the Indiana
legislature passed rules similar to 413–414, BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15, but the Indiana
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3. State Common Law Approaches
Several states have developed common law doctrines that apply
special rules to character evidence in sex crimes, including Rhode Island
and Washington’s “lustful disposition” exceptions to Rule 404(b).35
Other states, including Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
Maine, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, liberally extend the
application of Rule 404(b) non-propensity purposes, or offer wider
“latitude” in sexual assault cases.36 Some states do not acknowledge a
liberalized standard, but clearly engage in one.37 In this respect it is fair

Supreme Court held the statutes to be a nullity because they conflicted with the evidence rules
propounded by the Court, which has the exclusive right under the Indiana constitution to establish court
rules, including the rules of evidence. See Day v. State, 643 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Also, the
Delaware Supreme Court on the recommendation of its appointed Permanent Advisory Committee on
the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence has rejected Rules 413–414. See Thomas J. Reed, The ReBirth of the Delaware Rules of Evidence: A Summary of the 2002 Changes in the Delaware Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 5 DEL. L. REV. 155, 166–75 (2002) (praising the Delaware Supreme Court for not
adopting the rules); State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607–08 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (“In holding this
statute unconstitutional, this Court acts consistently with a long line of cases holding that the Missouri
constitution prohibits the admission of previous criminal acts as evidence of a defendant’s propensity.”).
35. See, e.g., State v. Greene, 823 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2003); State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137 (R.I.
2000); State v. Kilgore, 53 P.3d 974 (Wash. 2002); see Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992)
(discussing the common-law lustful disposition); G. Adam Cossey, Comment, A Dangerous Leap: The
Admission of Prior Offenses in Sexual-Assault and Child Molestation Cases in Arkansas, 61 ARK. L.
REV. 107 (2008) (critiquing the Arkansas common-law approach); Tamara Larsen, Sexual Violence Is
Unique: Why Evidence of Other Crimes Should Be Admissible in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Cases, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 177 (2006) (discussing Minnesota’s broad approach to Rule 404(b) nonpropensity purposes in child abuse cases).
36. For instance, the Maryland common law exception admits evidence to show the accused’s
propensity for illicit sexual relations, but only of the same type and with the same victim. Maryland
requires a clear and convincing standard for uncharged misconduct. See Thompson v. State, 988 A.2d
1011, 1014 (Md. 2010) (citing Vogel v State, 315 Md. 458, 554 (1989)). Colorado specifically extends
the use of Rule 404(b) by statute:
The prosecution may introduce evidence of other acts of the defendant to prove the
commission of the offense as charged for any purpose other than propensity, including:
Refuting defenses, such as consent or recent fabrication; showing a common plan,
scheme, design, or modus operandi, regardless of whether identity is at issue and
regardless of whether the charged offense has a close nexus as part of a unified
transaction to the other act; showing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, including
grooming of a victim, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or for any
other matter for which it is relevant. The prosecution may use such evidence either as
proof in its case in chief or in rebuttal, including in response to evidence of the
defendant’s good character.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-301 (3).
37. See, e.g., Jill C. Legg, State v. Ondricek: Admission of Prior Bad Acts—The Exception or the
Rule?, 42 S.D.L. REV. 165, 165 (1997) (discussing a South Dakota Supreme Court case in which a
twenty-year-old rape was admitted to prove intent and common scheme or plan and arguing that the
broad admission under South Dakota’s version of Rule 404(b) creates a “danger of overwhelming the
general rule of exclusion”). Even among the states that appear to retain a prohibition on propensity
evidence, the new federal rules have been influential. See, e.g., Hart v. State, 57 P.3d 348, 353 n.3
(Wyo. 2002) (admitting prior uncharged misconduct not to show propensity, but for plan, modus
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to say that the ban on character evidence has never been, from a
functional standpoint, absolute. Finally, many states make no particular
exception for prior sexual misconduct and treat it the same as any other
type of misconduct analyzed under Rule 404(b) or the state equivalent.38
C. Justifications for Special Rules Relating to Sex Crimes
Scholars and jurists debate the fairness of character evidence
concerning sexual propensity, particularly evidence of other bad acts.39
Prior sex-crime evidence used to show propensity can be invasive and
staggeringly prejudicial. It is objectionable for all the traditional reasons
that underlie the common-law ban on propensity evidence. Recent
psychological evidence reinforces the proposition that the accused faces
insurmountable prejudice when the jury learns of his prior sex crimes.
Polling indicates that Americans express more concern about child
molestation than any other danger to the community,40 so someone with
a prior sex crime may seem particularly dangerous. Ironically, these
sentiments exist even though the number of sex crimes has decreased by
every major measure for the past twenty years.41 Additionally,
operandi, and identity, and specifically citing Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15 to substantiate the
decision).
38. See, e.g., State v. McFarland, 721 S.E.2d 62, 77 (W. Va. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the majority’s refusal to admit prior defendant’s sexual conduct as evidence of motive or
plan and noting that “the majority’s rejection of the admission of the evidence, and its application to
future cases, will now allow serial rapists to be paraded in front of juries as All–American boy scouts.”).
39. See, e.g., 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 5411-16, 5411A-17A (Supp. 2012); James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules
of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157
F.R.D. 95, 114–15 (1994); Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional
Ramifications of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 181 (1996)
(noting the increased risk of due process violation because juries may be prejudiced by explicit
reference to prior bad sexual acts); Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the
Defendant?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1994) (summarizing various arguments against the sexual
propensity rules); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole
Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, n.34
(1996); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 663 (1999); Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section
Report to the House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995); Mark A. Sheft,
Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 82 (1995) (“Rule
413 erodes the presumption of innocence in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
40. Between Apr. 19, 2005 and May 1, 2005 a poll sponsored by CNN/USA Today and Gallup
asked respondents the degree to which they were concerned about various events occurring in their
community—a question that did not specifically refer to the likelihood of the different events. Leading
the list was sexual molestation of children, followed by sale or use of methamphetamine, use or sale of
cocaine, violent crime, and then acts of terrorism. Joseph Carroll, Crystal Meth, Child Molestation Top
Crime Concerns, GALLUP (May 3, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/16123/crystal-meth-child-molesta
tion-top-crime-concerns.aspx.
41. According to the Uniform Crime Reports, data compiled by the FBI from law enforcement
agencies across the country, the forcible rape rate in the United States has dropped 36% from 1992 to
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Americans think that child molesters are less likely to be rehabilitated
than perpetrators of other violent crimes, a reason to convict and throw
away the key.42 Such counterfactual beliefs and negative stereotypes
will lead to loathing the accused and wishing to prophylactically confine
anyone who has committed a past sex crime; hence, the unfair prejudice
of informing jurors of prior sex crimes is severe.
This Article, however, does not rehash the trenchant critique that
explains why the highly prejudicial sexual propensity rules are a terrible
idea. Plenty of excellent scholarship already exists on that point, and the
evidence establishment, both the professoriate43 and the rulemakers,44
2010. Uniform Crime Reports, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crimein-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). According to the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS), rapes and sexual assaults have been dropping as well. National Crime
Victimization Survey Resource Guide, NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/NACJD/NCVS/. Between 1993 and 2010, the number of reported rapes and sexual assaults
dropped 40%—from 312,580 to 188,380. See CRAIG PERKINS, PATSY A. KLAUS, LISA D. BASTIAN &
ROYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1993, at 9 (1993). The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), which aggregates
and publishes statistics from child protection agencies across the country, including all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, found that sexual abuse of children has dropped 58% from 1992
to 2008. DAVID FINKELHOR, LISA JONES & ANNE SHATTUCK, UPDATED TRENDS IN CHILD
MALTREATMENT, 2008 1–2 (2010).
42. Half the 2005 sample was asked, “Just your best guess, do you think people who commit the
crime of child sexual molestation are more likely or less likely to be successfully rehabilitated than
people who commit other serious crimes?” 8% said more likely and 77% said less. Interestingly, more
people in the April 2005 study seemed to believe in the possibility of rehabilitation than in a similar
study conducted fourteen years earlier. The Star Tribune National Poll interviewed 1,101 participants
between Aug. 6 and Aug. 25, 1991. These participants were asked:
Now some questions about people convicted of sex offenses such as rape, sexually
abusing a child or incest. Do you agree or disagree that most sex offenders continue to
repeat their crimes no matter what the punishment? (If agree/disagree ask: Do you feel
strongly or not so strongly about that?)
78% agreed strongly, 9% agreed not strongly, 3% disagreed not strongly, 4% disagreed strongly, and
7% didn’t know. AVIVA A. ORENSTEIN, EMPIRICAL FALLACIES OF EVIDENCE LAW : A CRITICAL LOOK
AT ADMISSION OF PRIOR SEX CRIMES 13 (2012) (reviewing Star Tribune National Poll, 8/6/91–8/25/91,
Question 13).
43. In a letter to Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, a group of law professors expressed concern over numerous ambiguities including questions
concerning the discretion of the trial judge and the interaction with other rules concerning hearsay, best
evidence, and limitation on impeachment of witnesses. See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 335 (1995) (quoting and discussing the
letter).
44. The Advisory Committee on Evidence of the Federal Judicial Center made the following
comments on Rules 413–414, which bypassed the regular rule-making process:
Furthermore, the new rules, which are not supported by empirical evidence, could
diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal
cases and parties in civil cases against undue prejudice. These protections form a
fundamental part of American jurisprudence and have evolved under long-standing rules
and case law. A significant concern identified by the committee was the danger of
convicting a criminal defendant for past, as opposed to charged, behavior or for being a
bad person.
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have made no secret of their opposition to the approach heralded by
Rules 413–414 on the grounds that it is wildly unfair. For reasons of
unfair prejudice and lack of due process, five state supreme courts have
rejected these rules.45
Instead, rather than attacking the unfair prejudice engendered by
Rules 413–414, we question the basic premise of these Rules. Many
critiques of these Rules and their state analogs begin by conceding the
probative value of the evidence and then focus on the extreme prejudice
it engenders. We, however, marshal the empirical evidence and focus
our challenge to these Rules’ validity notwithstanding the unfairness
they engender.
Proponents primarily justify these rules in three ways. First, they
argue that there is something particularly difficult about proving sex
crimes. This argument points to the special need for other-act evidence
because without it, the jurors cannot be convinced to convict. Sex
crimes usually occur without witnesses other than the perpetrator and
the victim; often there is no definitive physical evidence of the crime.
Even when such physical evidence exists, a delay in reporting may make
collection impossible.46 The trial becomes a swearing match between
the alleged perpetrator and the alleged victim.47 In the case of Rule 413,
which involves rape of adults, the accused will often argue consent, and
the jury is apt to believe various rape myths that may lead jurors to
believe that the victim was “asking for it” or consented and then later
lied about the encounter.48 Jurors themselves may be in denial about the
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Report Of The Judicial Conference On The Admission Of
Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 52–53 (1995) (submitted
pursuant to section 320935 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322 (1994)).
45. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
46. See David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOYOLA L. REV. 439, 490
(2001) (“[E]ven if physical evidence did exist at one time, it often has been destroyed by the time the
crime is reported and investigated.”); Matson, supra note 29, at 282 (quoting proponents of Nebraska’s
new rule that “[sex] offenses result in long-lasting and serious harm to the affected individual” they “are
often not reported or are reported long after the offense took place, and that typically there are no
witnesses to these offenses except for the accused and the victim. For these reasons, there is often no
evidence of the assault, except for the conflicting testimony of the victim and the accused”) (footnotes
omitted).
47. Reneta Lawson Mack, A LAYPERSON’S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW 77 (Greenwood
Publishing Co. 1999) (“Therefore, the typical rape trial becomes a contest of credibility. Who is more
credible—the victim or the defendant? Which version of events is more believable?”). As
Representative Molinari explained, “Sexual assault and child molestation do not ordinarily occur in the
presence of multiple credible witnesses. The Rules of Evidence need to be changed to improve the
ability of prosecutors to obtain convictions against the perpetrators of such crimes.” Representative
Susan Molinari, Remarks to the House of Representatives on Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules
of Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault and Child Molestation (Oct. 22, 1991).
48. Rape myths are a “prejudicial, stereotyped or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and
rapists.” The rape myth includes attitudes and beliefs that are used in order to justify male sexual
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prevalence of acquaintance rape.49 Rule 413 addresses the maddening
problem of repeat offenders who manage to discredit each survivor
individually.50 In the case of Rule 414, involving children, the accused
will often argue that the child is vengeful, confused, fanciful, or has
been encouraged to fabricate accusations by an adult.51 The Rules,
therefore, address the power imbalance between the victim and the
accused. Additionally, because the standard for conviction is beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the events are often embarrassing and shameful
for the victim, without corroborative evidence a victim’s testimony
could seem tentative and unconvincing, leading to acquittal.
Furthermore, even though jurors are sometimes explicitly instructed that
one witness’s testimony constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
conviction, they may be uncomfortable rendering a guilty verdict
(especially in a rape or child molestation case) without more evidence.
In short, supporters emphasize the necessity of admitting prior sex
crimes, arguing that without such evidence victims will not be believed
and convictions cannot be won.52
A second set of arguments focuses on the victim, emphasizing both
the special harm endured and the unique empowerment of helping to
convict perpetrators. Some advocates believe that the unique nature of
sex crimes, which cause a distinctive and devastating type of harm, 53
demands special evidentiary treatment. Senator Kyl, a sponsor of Rules
413–414, noted that even when the victim is “too traumatized,
intimidated, or humiliated to file a complaint and go through the full

violence against women. Sarah Theodore, Note, An Integrated Response to Sexting: Utilization of
Parents and Schools in Deterrence, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 365, n.53 (2011) (citing Janet
Anderson, Rape Myths: Letters from the Editor, 9 RESEARCH & ADVOCACY DIGEST 1 (2007), available
at http://www.wcsap.org/advocacy/pdf/rapemyths0507.pdf); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013
(1991); Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsibility and Legal
Reform, 22 COLUMB. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011).
49. See Orenstein, supra note 39, at 692.
50. See id. at 679–80.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998). Children, however,
cannot consent to molestation, even if they don’t resist or might have enjoyed the encounter. Kenneth
V. Lanning, Compliant Child Victims: Confronting an Uncomfortable Reality, in VIEWING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (2005), available at http://www.denreed.com/documentts/6bComplia
ntChildVictimsLanning2005.pdf.
52. As Senator Robert Dole explained of the new rules: “[E]vidence of this type is frequently of
critical importance in establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and . . . concealing it from the
jury often carries a grave risk that such a criminal will be turned loose to claim other victims.” 137
CONG. REC. S9081 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991).
53. See Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (citing
research regarding the long-lasting negative effects associated with sexual assault, which causes greater
psychological harm to victims than do other crimes, including causing PTSD, affecting the sexual
behavior of child victims and the sexual functioning of adult rape victims and adult interpersonal
relationships).
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procedure of a criminal prosecution,” such victims “are often willing to
bear the burden of testifying when they find out that the person who
marred their lives has also victimized others.”54
In sum, allowing the jurors to consider the accused’s similar prior bad
acts and his character for sexual deviance will increase conviction rates
and imprisonment, thereby protecting and empowering vulnerable
populations. Arguably, introducing evidence of the accused’s prior bad
conduct would also sensitize our society to the prevalence of sex crimes
and empower victims.55 The increased rate of prosecution and
conviction would promote general deterrence, illuminating the
widespread problem of sexual violence and signaling our seriousness
about addressing sex crimes.
The problem with the above arguments is that they advocate changing
the rules of the game at the expense of the accused merely because the
alleged harm is so egregious and the crime so difficult to prove.56 The
two arguments above are based on raw need and cannot withstand a
presumption of innocence; they cannot serve as a principled justification
for departing from the evidence traditional ban on propensity. In the
next Part, however, we examine a final, central argument concerning the
probative value of sexual propensity evidence: that such prior bad acts
are particularly probative because sex crimes are highly recidivistic.
III. EVIDENCE LAW’S MISTAKEN PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF
AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SEX CRIMES AND THEIR PERPETRATORS
Proponents of admitting evidence of propensity in sex crimes focus
on the purportedly unique aspects of the alleged perpetrators. Those
who favor special evidence rules for prior sex crimes justify this
treatment based on their perceptions of perpetrators. They rely on three
related claims about the psychological makeup of perpetrators: (1)
perpetrators are deviant, antisocial, remorseless individuals;57 (2) they
are highly recidivistic; and (3) the sexual perversions prompting these
54. 140 CONG. REC. H7334 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 994).
55. Also, Rules 413–414 and their state analogs arguably allow victims to speak out in
confidence, knowing that they will be supported in their assertions and thus more likely to be treated
with respect by the jury. Senator Kyl, a sponsor of Rules 413–414, argued that they would “go a long
way toward neutralizing the psychological damage a rape victim often experiences going through the
judicial process.” Id.
56. See Leonard, supra note 46, at 490 (“[C]ourts have long approved admission of such
evidence in sex crime cases for at least three reasons, all of which tend toward the same conclusion—
that proof of the crime’s occurrence is exceedingly difficult to muster . . . . At base, then, courts have
admitted the uncharged misconduct evidence in these cases because it is needed.”).
57. Rivera v. Rivera, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Kan. 2003) (noting that a history of
molestation is “exceptionally probative” in showing “an unusual disposition” that “does not exist in
ordinary people”).
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crimes cannot be cured.58 These unique qualities brand sex offenders as
fiends, unalterably different from average people for whom propensity
rules are necessary and justified.
A. Deviance
David Karp, a former lawyer in the Justice Department and chief
architect and defender of the Federal Rules 413–415, argued that
“[o]rdinary people do not commit outrages.” 59 Karp emphasized the
probative value of character evidence about an accused who committed
similar acts, contending that “evidence showing that the defendant has
committed sexual assaults on other occasions places him in a small class
of depraved criminals, and is likely to be highly probative in relation to
the pending charge.”60 This central assumption about perpetrators of sex
crimes—that they are a deviant, discrete group of outsiders and
psychopaths—justifies the sex propensity rules and encapsulates their
faulty psychological, statistical, and sociological presumptions.
The legislative history of Rules 413–414 is replete with
commentary—one even might say findings—that those who commit sex
crimes are truly deviant and thus utterly different from normal citizens.61
For instance, Representative Molinari stated, “[A] history of [child
molestation in a defendant] tends to be exceptionally probative because
it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant—a sexual or sadosexual interest in children—that simply does not exist in ordinary
people.”62

58. Treatment includes hormonal treatments (“chemical castration”), other drugs such as
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, surgical castration, and psychotherapy. Ryan C.W. Hall &
Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism,
Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issue, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 465–66 (2007). Hormonal
treatments “work by suppressing testosterone levels.” Id. at 466.
59. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20 (1994). Karp was senior counsel for the Office of Policy
Development, United States Department of Justice. The ideas for new rules originated in the
Department of Justice, and Karp was one of the original drafters. At least one court has confirmed that
David Karp’s article expanding on his address to the AALS carried the weight of legislative history,
according to the sponsors of Rule 413. See Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2002).
60. Karp, supra note 59, at 24 (emphasis added).
61. Obviously not all Senators thought Rules 413–414 were a good idea. Then Senator Joseph
Biden stated that “[i]t is a very dangerous amendment.” 139 CONG. REC. 27550 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1993). Realistically, however, he observed “that any amendment anyone would bring to the floor that
has anything to do with child molestation or sexual offenses is likely to get 51 votes here, no matter
what it is.” Id. Biden further mused that “if we said in cases of sexual molestation of a child we should
require the defendant to undergo electric shock treatment, we would probably get a vote for that here.
We would probably get a vote for that here, because everybody is against those heinous crimes.” Id.
62. 140 CONG. REC. 23603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994); see also Tamara Larsen, Sexual Violence
Is Unique: Why Evidence of Other Crimes Should Be Admissible in Sexual Assault and Child
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To fully understand and appreciate the lure of the sexual propensity
rules, we must examine the narrative underlying rape and child
molestation cases.63 In examining the cultural stories surrounding sex
crimes we find a special, truly despicable role for the perpetrator.
Supporters of Rules 413–414 argue that the probative value of the prior
rapes is high because the sexual aggressiveness and proclivities of
defendants are unique. In the area of adult rape, the prototypical “real”
rape64 is a tale of female chastity contrasted with uncontrollable, almost
bestial male lust.65 The villain of this fable is a sadistic, sex-crazed,
deviant, sociopathic loser who has no girlfriend.66 He is violent and
uses extreme force.67 There is the related myth that rapes are
perpetrated primarily by strangers and that only rarely do acquaintances
and intimates commit rape.68 The cultural paradigm is of strangers in
both senses—unknown to the victim and just simply strange.
In a similar vein, the iconic child molester cannot control his deviant
lustful urges and will offend repeatedly unless he is locked away

Molestation Cases, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 177 (2006) (discussing Minnesota’s broad approach to Rule
404(b) non-propensity purposes in child abuse cases).
63. Discussion of rape myths about victims is often used to justify Rules 413–415 as balancing
the scales because victims tend not to be believed. However, there are also myths about perpetrators
(which in their own ways may be harmful to women as well). For instance, if all rapists are presumed to
be creepy strangers, a fellow college student is less likely to be perceived as a “real rapist.” See SUSAN
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); see also Orenstein, supra note 39; Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott
Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81
B.U.L. REV 127 (2001).
64. See ESTRICH, supra note 63; Orenstein, supra note 39.
65. See ANDREW TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM (1999); N. Jermi Duru,
The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1315 (2004).
66. The cultural paradigm includes a victim—ideally young, attractive, and respectable—who
has been brutally attacked by a stranger. Elsewhere one of us has written about cultural expectations for
the victim, who is chaste, cautious, and truthful, reports the attack immediately, and has no
inconsistencies in her story. See Orenstein, supra note 39.
67. Some perpetrators benefit from the rape myth that “nice” (well educated, white, middle class,
employed) men do not rape and that only men who cannot secure normal consensual sex resort to rape.
See Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 281 (1993) (“Rapists are
aggressive, uncouth, lower-class strangers, probably African-American or Hispanic.”). Both Professor
Andrew Taslitz and Professor Katharine Baker discuss the role of race and racism in rape culture. See
TASLITZ, supra note 65; Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 589 (1997) (arguing that “Rule 413 and its supporting rationale fail
to acknowledge, much less incorporate, most of what scholars have learned about rape in the past
twenty-five years”). Torrey, supra note 48, at 1048. Similarly Professor Coombs quotes reactions to
William Kennedy Smith’s rape charge. One court watcher said, “I just find it hard to believe that
someone with that much money would have to resort to rape to get what he wants.” Coombs, supra, at
301 n.96.
68. James V. P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, Sex Role Stereotyping and Reactions to Depictions
of Stranger Versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 344, 345 (1983).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

810

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

forever.69 High profile cases like the rape and murder of Polly Klaas70
and Megan Kanka71 create the picture of a predatory sex fiend who
rapes and kills. The perpetrator is always male, and he is, like in the
cultural story of rape, usually a stranger. When the victim knows him,
the perpetrator is someone like a priest, an odd unattached male, or a
sociopath in a position of trust and power who takes advantage of a
position of trust to offend over and over again.72
B. Recidivism: Powerless to Stop and Impossible to Cure
Another related trope about sex-crime perpetrators is that they are
highly recidivistic. As Representative Molinari explained, “Only in
these two charges [rape and child molestation] would we extend these
Federal rules of evidence, two charges, where there are no witnesses and
no corroboration and where there is a record of repeat offending.”73
Representative Molinari quoted the National Institute of Mental Health,
which she claimed offered the following statistic, that child molesters
“molest children 117 times in their lifetime.”74
Senator Dole, another sponsor, also revealed his image of sex
offenders in justifying Rules 413–414. He explained, “I think if
somebody is a repeat offender, if you brought in eight or nine women,
for example, or eight or nine children, and he had one offense after

69. See Tamara Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism: The Origin and Centrality of an Urban
Legend, 34 INT. J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 186 (2011); Tamara Rice Lave, The Iconic Child Molester:
What We Believe and Why We Believe It (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
70. See Bob Egelko, Death Sentence Upheld for Polly Klaas’ Killer, S.F. CHRON. (June 2, 2009),
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Death-sentence-upheld-for-Polly-Klaas-killer-3296333.php;
Defendant in Klaas Slaying Wears High-Voltage Belt in Courtroom, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-02-08/news/mn-33758_1_polly-klaas; Davis Faces Death Penalty for
Kidnapping and Killing 12-year-old Polly Klaas, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 25, 1996),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-25/features/9606250201_1_polly-klaas-richard-allen-davisdeath-penalty.
71. See ‘Megan’s Law’ Killer Escapes Death Under N.J. Execution Ban, CNN (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-12-17/politics/death.penalty_1_death-penalty-killer-escapes-death-capitalpunishment?_s=PM:POLITICS; Robert Hanley, Study Says Megan Slaying Fits Pattern for Such Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/23/nyregion/study-says-megan-slayingfits-pattern-for-such-cases.html?ref=jessektimmendequas; William Glaberson, Doubt is Cast on Claims
of Killer’s Tortured Life, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/18/nyregion/do
ubt-is-cast-on-claims-of-killer-s-tortured-life.html?ref=jessektimmendequas.
72. See Jerry Sandusky Trial: All You Need to Know About Allegations, How Case Unfolded,
CNN (June 11, 2012), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/11/jerry-sandusky-trial-all-you-need-toknow-about-allegations-how-case-unraveled/.
73. 137 Cong. Rec. 26546 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991).
74. Id. This statistic can be found on National Alert Registry site at Statistics on Child
Molestation, NAT’L ALERT REGISTRY, http://www.registeredoffenderslist.org/blog/sex-offenders/childmolestation-statistics/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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another, it would be probative.”75 Interestingly, the Senator picked a
high number of victims, thus positing a terrifying rate of recidivism.
Dole added that “[i]f it had not happened for 10 years, it probably would
not have any value.”76
Paul McNulty, former director of policy at the Department of Justice,
testified at a congressional hearing on the rules, arguing that the criminal
justice system responds inadequately to the scourge of sex crimes.
“Given what we know about the recidivist nature of sex offenders, you
might think that the criminal justice system does all that it can to keep
them in prison. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the
truth.”77
A similar focus on recidivism is apparent in states that adopted
versions of Rules 413–414. The Kansas Supreme Court, in calling for a
change to Kansas’ evidence law (which was later adopted to resemble
Rules 413–414) observed:
[T]he modern psychology of pedophilia tells us that propensity evidence
may actually possess probative value for juries faced with deciding the
guilt or innocence of a person accused of sexually abusing a child. In
short, sexual attraction to children and a propensity to act upon it are
defining symptoms of this recognized mental illness.78

The Kansas Supreme Court further noted that “a diagnosis of pedophilia
can be among the justifications for indefinite restriction of an offender’s
liberty to ensure the provision of treatment to him or her and the
protection of others who could become victims.”79 The Court found it
“at least ironic that propensity evidence can be part of the support for an
indefinite civil commitment, but cannot be part of the support for an
initial criminal conviction in a child sex crime prosecution.”80
The legislative record of the California statute admitting “other acts”
character evidence in sex offense cases indicates that proponents also
justified the statute by looking at recidivism rates and focusing on the

75. 139 CONG. REC. 27549 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
76. Id.
77. On a related issue of sex-offender registries, Minnesota Senator Durenberger advocated for
legislation that:
[W]ill help communities break the vicious cycle of child sexual victimization, by
requiring people who are convicted of sex offenses against children—and these offenders
are a group especially prone to recidivism—to register with law enforcement agencies
every time they change address, for a period of ten years after their release.
139 CONG. REC. 30580 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (emphasis added).
78. State v. Prine, 200 P.3d 1, 15–16 (Kan. 2009) (citing the AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 527–28 (4th ed. 1994)).
79. Id. at 16 (citing Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act that provides for civil confinement
for those who cannot control their dangerousness).
80. Id.
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special deviance of those who commit sex crimes. It cited comments in
the Congressional Record regarding the passage of Federal Rules of
Evidence and an article written by David Karp, the author of Rules 413–
414.81 As the legislative history from the California Senate explained,
“The propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute
among the general public. Therefore, evidence that a particular
defendant has such a propensity is especially probative and should be
considered by the trier of fact when determining the credibility of a
victim’s testimony.”82
Finally, those who call for extension of Rules 413–415 to the states
base their arguments on their perception that the recidivism rate for sex
crime perpetrators is unusually high.83
IV. WHAT CAN PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIMINOLOGY TELL US ABOUT
PERPETRATOR PROFILES AND RECIDIVISM?
As indicated in the previous Part, an essential justification for the
propensity rules for sexual misconduct rests on the notion that rape and
child molestation are highly unusual crimes perpetrated by a very small
disturbed segment of the population with a compulsion to commit such
terrible acts repeatedly. We must question the accuracy of these
presumptions justifying Rules 413–414 and their state analogs: What are
the profiles of rapists and child molesters? What are their recidivism
rates?
In trying to answer these questions, one is immediately struck by the
divergent ways evidence rulemakers on the one hand, and psychologists
and criminologists on the other, approach them. From a legal
perspective, law generally applies the same propensity rules for adult
rape and child molestation (although a few jurisdictions have a
propensity rule just for those who molest children). The law does not,
however, differentiate among sub-types of rapists or child molesters.
By contrast, the psychologists and criminologists engage in a much
more nuanced approach. Even when they aggregate the data into large
groups, researchers in recent years have been careful to distinguish
rapists from child molesters and to look at the different risks that
offenders pose based on their age and the nature of their crimes.

81. See California Legislature, The Assembly Journal 3277 (1995–96 Regular Session).
82. Sen. Comm. on Criminal Procedure, Floor Analyses of A.B. No. 822, July 18, 1995, at 8.
83. See, e.g., Lombardi, supra note 33 (listing recidivism rates of rapists and child molesters at
around forty-five percent). But see G. Adam Cossey, Note, A Dangerous Leap: The Admission of Prior
Offenses in Sexual-Assault and Child-Molestation Cases in Arkansas, 61 ARK. L. REV. 107, 122 (2008)
(arguing against the adoption of such rules for Arkansas and noting that “[s]cience, however, has been
unable to clearly demonstrate a higher rate of recidivism for sex offenders than for other criminals”).
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The compulsive, repetitive sex offender—one who serially and
compulsively preys on women and children and who is the inspiration
for the sexual propensity rules—does indeed exist.84 But many other
types of sex offenders do not fit this image. The critical question for
evidentiary purposes is whether the unable-to-control-himself sex
offender is sufficiently prevalent to justify a special exception to the rule
against propensity evidence.
A. Psychological Profile of Sex-Crime Perpetrators
Community surveys indicate that 5% to 20% of men admit to at least
one instance of criminal sexual aggression, whereas 1 to 2% of the adult
male population will eventually be convicted of a sex crime.85 In truth,
many men rape, and even more say they would do so if they were sure
they could get away with it.86
Despite the stock image that is often presented in the press, “sex
offenders are a heterogeneous group.”87 No particular psychological
profile distinguishes sex offenders from other types of criminals.88 They
can be any race, age, or sexual orientation; they can be repeat offenders
or one-time perpetrators.89 Many commit other types of crimes, but
some exhibit only sex-specific criminal behavior. Yet, sex offenders do
share some notable similarities. Most offenders are men;90 most victims
are women or girls, and the molester is usually a relative of the victim.91
84. See Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3 (1987).
85. R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual
Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 1154, 1154
(2005).
86. See David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected
Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002) (finding 6.4% of questioned college males (120 out of
1882) self-reported acts qualified as rape or attempted rape; of this group, 63.3% reported committing
repeat rapes, averaging about six rapes per perpetrator). In one experiment, thirty percent of the men
polled indicated that if they would not be caught, there would be some likelihood of their raping (rating
themselves two or above on a five-point scale). Check & Malamuth, supra note 68, at 346–47.
According to Torrey, one study found that over half the college age male population surveyed would
rape if they were assured that they would not be caught or punished. Torrey, supra note 48, at 1023.
See also Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L J. 205, 212
(2011) (citing studies finding that “35% of college men indicated some likelihood that they would rape
if they could be assured of getting away with it” and a “1987 study indicat[ing] that 50% would ‘force a
woman into having sex’ if they would not get caught”).
87. Berliner, supra note 53, at 1207.
88. Id. at 1207–08.
89. Id.
90. John B. Murray, Psychological Profile of Pedophiles and Child Molesters, 134 J. PSYCH.
211 (2000).
91. Id.
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In addition, perpetrators against children often claim that they were
victims of child abuse themselves.92
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) views child molesters
very differently from the way it views rapists. The APA has classified
pedophilia as a psychiatric disorder since 1968 when it first included it
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).93
Although the DSM makes it clear that not everyone with pedophilia will
molest a child,94 its inclusion in the DSM reflects a consensus among
psychiatrists of the seriousness of the disorder.95 At the same time, not
everyone who molests a child is a pedophile. Some adult men who have
sex with children do so because the kids are accessible and they can get
away with it, not because they have a recurrent, intense sexual attraction
to prepubescent children.
By contrast, the APA has never classified rape as a psychiatric
disorder. Recently, the authors of the revised DSM-V again rejected
including “coercive paraphilia” as a primary diagnosis.96 Thus, although
rapists may suffer from some form of psychiatric disorder, being a rapist
itself is not a mental disorder. Furthermore, most rapists are not sexual
sadists as defined by the DSM.97 As Allen Frances, MD, Chair of the
DSM-IV Task Force, explained:
92. Id.
93. The diagnostic criteria for pedophilia are defined in DSM-IV-TR as follows:
(A) Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies,
sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children
(generally age 13 years or younger); (B) The person has acted on these sexual urges, or
the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty; (C) The
person is at least age 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child or children in
Criterion A.
Pedophelia, DSM, § 302.2, http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=22&sectionnid=1891
601 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); see also See What is Pedophilia?, WEB MD, http://www.webmd.com/me
ntal-health/features/explaining-pedophilia (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
94. See Pedophelia, DSM, supra note 93, § 302.2(B).
95. See DSM: Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRY ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/
practicee/dsm/dsm-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
96. Allen Frances, DSM 5 Rejects Coercive Paraphilia: Confirming Yet Again that Rape is not a
Mental Disorder, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 26, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-indistress/201105/dsm-5-rejects-coercive-paraphilia.
97. The DSM V proposes the following definition of sexual sadism:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent and intense sexual arousal from the
physical or psychological suffering of another person, as manifested by fantasies, urges,
or behaviors. B. The individual has acted on these sexual urges with a nonconsenting
individual, or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
Sexual Sadism Disorder, DSM-5 (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/propo
sedrevision.aspx?rid=188. This is almost identical to previous definitions. See Richard B. Krueger, The
DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Sadism, ARCH. SEX. BEHAV. (Dec. 2009),
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Sex%20and%20GID%20Lit%20Reviews/Paraphilias/KRUEGERSA
DISMDSM.pdf.
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For most rapists, violence is no more than a tool to force the
nonconsenting person to give in. In contrast, the stereotyped and
ritualistic violence in sadistic rape fulfills deep-seated fantasies that are
the main event of the sex act.98

That rapists are not by definition mentally ill is consistent with the
feminist insight that rape, particularly acquaintance rape, is
widespread.99 Rapists are not marked by any obvious character traits,
appearance, class, or race, but merely reflect our society’s generalized
tolerance of violence against women.100 Many otherwise normalseeming, socially appropriate men force women to have sex. Others,
particularly in the date rape situation, may prefer consensual sex but
may willfully misinterpret or be uninterested in the victim’s desires.101
B. Sex Crime Recidivism Rates
Psychologists and criminologists study recidivism rates because they
wish to prevent future crimes and assess how various treatments are
working.102 Recidivism rates interest jurists and evidence scholars for
an entirely different reason: Are sexual predators so recidivistic in their
behavior that once a perpetrator has committed a sex crime, strong
evidence exists that he has committed another? Unlike predictions of
dangerousness or assessments of treatment plans that look to past
behavior to predict future behavior, this use of recidivism employs a
propensity argument to contend circumstantially that other past behavior
98. Allen J. Frances, Most Rapists Are Not Sadists: How to Tell the Difference and Why It So
Important, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-indistress/201104/most-rapists-are-not-sadists.
99. See Orenstein, supra note 39; Baker, supra note 67.
100. By focusing on women as victims, we do not mean to imply that men are not victims of rape.
See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2011) (calling for reform on attitudes
towards male rape); James E. Robertson, The “Turning-Out” of Boys in a Man’s Prison: Why and How
We Need to Amend the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 44 IND. L. REV. 819 (2011) (discussing rape of
young male inmates in adult prisons); CDC, Youth Risk Surveillance Behavior, 61 SURVEILLANCE
SUMMARIES 1, 66 (2012) (4.5% of high school boys questioned reported having been physically forced
to have sex at some point in their lives); Leslie Linthicum, The Nightmare of Male Rape, ABQ J (Jul. 8,
2012), http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/07/08/upfront/the-nightmare-of-male-rape.html.
101. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 381, 382, 388–98 (2005) (explaining how date rape often happens due to male “selfdeception,” which occurs when the alleged rapist consciously, but incorrectly, believes he has the
woman’s consent when, at some less-than-fully conscious level, he knows otherwise); R. Karl Hanson
& Heather Scott, Assessing Perspective-Taking Among Sexual Offenders, Nonsexual Criminals, and
Nonoffenders, 7 SEXUAL ABUSE 259, 259–77 (1995); Neil M. Malamuth & Lisa M. Brown, Sexually
Aggressive Men’s Perceptions of Women’s Communications: Testing Three Explanations, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 699, 699–712 (1994).
102. See, e.g., Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 85, at 1154. The prior bad act need not be
convicted conduct. The judge need only find that the jury could reasonably believe the prior act
occurred to admit it under Rules 413–414.
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occurred. Thus, even if all sex offenders were highly recidivistic—a
proposition that we will show is not supported by existing studies—
there is nevertheless a legitimate question concerning how jurists and
evidence scholars should use the data. Mere statistical correlations of
tendencies of a group of past offenders do not address the actions of a
particular offender. Being statistically predisposed to reoffend does not
mean the person actually did so.103 People are more interesting and
complicated than that.104
In discussing recidivism rates, it is essential to distinguish general
recidivism (commission of any subsequent crime) from recidivism
specifically for a sex crime. The justification for Rules 413–414 is
not that the accused will commit some random other future crime, but
that a past sex crime is highly predictive of more of the same. Study
after study, however, has cast doubt on this core assumption.
1. Department of Justice Study (2003)
In 2003, the Department of Justice (DOJ) published a report studying
the recidivism of sex offenders who had been released in 1994.105 The
DOJ study followed 9,691 sex offenders—the entire population of
violent sex offenders released from prison in fifteen states.106 “Violent”
means that the offender either used or threatened to use force or,
although the offender did not use force, he did not have the victim’s
“factual” or “legal consent.” Lack of factual consent means that for
physical reasons, the victim did consent, such as when the victim was
unconscious. Lack of legal consent means that the victim willingly
participated in the sexual act but was deemed too young or of

103. Thanks to Miguel Mendez for reemphasizing this point to us.
104. A faith, particularly in America, in the human ability to change is evidenced by the plethora
of self-help books and twelve step programs. See Esra Coker Körpez, Urban Values and American Self
Help: Reading the “City” As an Agent of Self-Transformation, TRANS: INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN (Jan. 2012), http://www.inst.at/trans/18Nr/II-2/koerpez18.htm (“The United
States with its 2.48 billion dollar a year self-improvement industry that makes up 6 percent of the entire
book market is one of the leaders in the world in selling, marketing and spreading a privatized concept
of the self whose potential of growth is unlimited and inexorable. In fact, it would not be misleading to
say that self-help is in the cultural DNA of the United States where individuals continuously struggle to
realize themselves by mapping out their life projects all with the sense that it is their life choices that
play a prominent role in their making as well as their unmaking.”); ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE PROTEAN
SELF: HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN AGE OF FRAGMENTATION (1993) (describing and lauding the modern
ability to reinvent oneself amid the challenge of a rapidly changing world); Robin Room, “Healing
Ourselves and our Planet”: The Emergence of a Generalized Twelve-Step Consciousness, 19 CONTEMP.
DRUG. PROBS. 717 (1992) (describing some of the features of “12-step consciousness”).
105. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX
OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1 (2003) [hereinafter DOJ].
106. Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 1.
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insufficient mental competence to do so.107
The authors of the study then looked at the prison and other records to
subdivide the offenders by nature of crime.108 They were subdivided
into four categories: 3,115 rapists; 6,576 sexual assaulters; 4,295 child
molesters, and 443 statutory rapists.109 Researchers continued to track
released offenders during the entire three-year period.110 If, for instance,
a person was rearrested for burglary and then later for rape, both of
those arrests would have been recorded.111
The DOJ found that 5.3% (517) of convicted sex offenders were
rearrested for a new sex crime within three years after release from
prison.112 The DOJ then looked at the recidivism rates of specific
types of sex offenders. They found that 5.0% (155) of convicted
rapists,113 5.5% (362) of sexual assaulters, 5.0% (22) of statutory
rapists, and 5.1% (221) of child molesters114 were rearrested for a
new sex crime within 3 years after release. All of those rearrested for
a new sex crime were men.115
As compared with almost all other types of offenders, released sex
offenders were the least likely to be rearrested for the same crime
within three years of release from prison. The Bureau of Justice
Statisticians Langan and Levin found that 2.5% of rapists were
rearrested for rape,116 and the DOJ found that 3.3% of child molesters
were arrested for another sex crime against a child.117 In contrast,
during that same three year period, Langan and Levin found that
13.4% of robbers were rearrested for robbery; 22% of assailants were
rearrested for assault; 23.4% of burglars were rearrested for burglary;
33.9% of thieves were rearrested for larceny or theft; 11.5% of car
thieves were rearrested for car theft; and 41.2% of drug offenders
were rearrested for a drug crime. Among released offenders only
those convicted of homicide had a specialized recidivism rate lower
than rapists and child molesters.118
107. DOJ, supra note 105, at 3.
108. Id. at 37.
109. Id. at 1. It was possible for these categories to overlap; for instance, a person could be
categorized as a rapist and a child molester.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 34.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 24.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994
(2002).
117. DOJ, supra note 105, at 1.
118. Just 1.2% of homicide perpetrators were rearrested for homicide within three years after
release from prison. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 9.
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In sum, the DOJ study indicates that few sex offenders are
rearrested for committing a new sex crime, and sex offenders are less
likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any crime at all.
Forty-three percent of sex offenders released in 1994 were arrested
for a new crime within three years (but that figure, of course.
includes non-sex crimes).119 In contrast, 67.5% of non-sex offenders
released in 1994 were arrested for any new crime within three
years.120
Although convicted sex offenders have a low recidivism rate, they
were significantly more likely to be arrested for a new sex crime than
released offenders who had not been convicted of a sex crime.121
Compared to 5.3% of convicted sex offenders, only 1.3% of persons
convicted for non-sex-related offenses were subsequently arrested for
a sex crime within three years after release.122 Less than half of 1%
of those people previously convicted of a non-sex offense were
rearrested for a new sex crime against a child.123 Put another way,
Langan and Levin calculated that a rapist’s odds of being rearrested
for a new rape are 3.2 times greater than a non-rapist’s odds of such
an arrest.124 This comparison, however, should not obfuscate the
larger point that statistically, sex-crime offenders have much lower
recidivism rates for sex crimes than robbers, drug addicts, and
assailants have for repeating their convicted offenses.
2. Other Recidivism Studies
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. In 2009, Hanson and
Morton-Bourgnon conducted a meta-analysis of twenty-one sex
offender studies from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and other countries and found an overall sexual recidivism rate of
119. DOJ, supra note 105, at 13.
120. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 1.
121. This fact has led to some confusion in reading the DOJ data. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 33,
at 653–54 (“Another distinguishing factor of sex crimes is the high recidivism rates among sex
offenders. According to a 2003 Department of Justice report, sex offenders were rearrested for new sex
crimes within three years of release at a rate four times greater than other released convicts. Department
of Justice data concluded that ‘[r]eleased rapists were 10.5 times as likely as non-rapists to be arrested
for rape’ and that people convicted of sexual assault were ‘7.5 times as likely as those convicted of other
crimes to be arrested for a new sexual assault.’”); Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim:
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOUS.
L. REV. 1729, 1740 (1999) (citing a Psychology Today article for the conclusion that “sexual offenses
involve highly repetitive behavior” and asserting that some child molesters “are habitual offenders,
basically incurable, and should be incarcerated for life” based on Kansas v. Hendricks, which permitted
incarceration of habitual sexual offenders after they completed their criminal term).
122. DOJ, supra note 105, at 24.
123. Id. at 30.
124. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 10.
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11.5%.125 In 1998, Hanson and Bussière conducted a similar metaanalysis of 61 studies from six different countries including the United
States.126 They found that over an average follow-up time of four to five
years, the sex offense recidivism rate was 13.4%.127 In 2007, using
arrest data from 1990–1997 collected by the Illinois State Police,128
Sample and Bray found that fewer than 4% of convicted child molesters
were rearrested for any sex offense within one, three, or five years after
their release from custody.129 They also found that approximately 7% of
convicted rapists were rearrested for any sex offense within five years
after release.130 In 1997, the DOJ released a study authored by Allen J.
Beck and Bernard E. Shipley at the Bureau of Justice Statistics that
analyzed the recidivism rate of rapists released from prison in 1983.131
Beck and Shepley found that 7.7% of rapists were rearrested for rape
within three years of release.132
Other studies, however, have found significantly higher recidivism
rates. For instance, Hanson, Scott, and Steffy studied the long-term
recidivism of 191 child molesters released from a maximum-security,
Their
provincial correctional institution in Ontario, Canada.133
recidivism rate, as defined by conviction for a new sex crime over a 15
to 30 year period, was 35.1%.134 As another example, Rice, Harris, and
Quinsey followed 54 rapists (defined as anyone who had sexually

125. R. Karl Hanson & Kelley E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments
for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 21 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1, 3–4, 6
(2009) (evaluating accuracy of prediction models). The recidivism rate is higher if other types of crimes
are included. For prior sex-crime perpetrators, the sexual or violent recidivism rate is 19.5%; it is 33.2%
if all types of crimes are considered. Id.
126. R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 348, 350 (1998).
127. Id. at 357.
128. Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Different? An Examination of
Rearrest Patterns, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 83, 88 (2006).
129. Id. at 95.
130. Id.
131. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983
(1989).
132. Id. at 6.
133. R. Karl Hanson, Heather Scott & Richard A. Steffy, A Comparison of Child Molesters and
Non-Sexual Criminals: Risk Predictors and Long-Term Recidivism, 32 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 325, 327 (1995).
134. Id. at 332. In assessing the relevance of this study, it is critical to note that this study has a
much smaller sample size than the DOJ study (191 vs. 9,691), occurred in a different place (Canada vs.
the U.S.), and offenders concerned were released decades before (1958–1974 vs. 1994–1997). For an
in-depth discussion of the differences between these two studies, see Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling
Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration At What Cost, 14 NEW CRIMINAL L. R. 213, 245–
47.
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assaulted or attempted to sexually assault a female age 14 or older)135
released from a maximum-security psychiatric hospital in Canada.136
Their average age was 30 with a standard deviation of approximately
10.137 The average follow-up period was 46 months, and recidivism was
defined as conviction for a new sex crime. The recidivism rate was
28%.138 Even if these higher numbers are correct, they are still
significantly below the recidivism rates for other types of offenders. For
instance, Langan and Levin found that during a three-year period, 33.9%
of thieves were rearrested for larceny or theft, and 41.2% of drug
offenders were re-arrested for a drug crime.139
C. Sexual Recidivism Rates over Time
Studies uniformly indicate that recidivism rates drop each year after
an offender’s release.
For all crimes (and almost all behaviours) the likelihood that the behavior
will reappear decreases the longer the person has abstained from that
behaviour. The recidivism rate within the first two years after release
from prison is much higher than the recidivism rate between years 10 and
12 after release from prison.140

Harris and Hanson found that the rate of recidivism in the populations
they studied decreased by half every five years.141 An earlier study by
the same authors found that the risk of individual recidivism decreases
over time—from 14% at the five-year mark, to 20% at the ten-year
mark, and 27% at the twenty-year mark.142 Thus, the longer someone
remains in the community without reoffending, the less likely it is that

135. Marnie E. Rice, Grant T. Harris, & Vernon L. Quinsey, A Follow-Up of Rapists Assessed in
a Maximum-Security Psychiatric Facility, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 435, 437 (1990). This study
utilized a broader definition of rape than would be employed under U.S. criminal law.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 439. The average age at the time of release for those who reoffended and those who
did not was 29.9, but the standard deviation for those who did not recidivate was 10.2 and for those who
did was 29.9. Id.
138. Id. at 442.
139. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 9. Langan and Levin also found that 13.4% of robbers
were rearrested for robbery; 22% of assailants were rearrested for assault; 23.4% of burglars were
rearrested for burglary; and 11.5% of car thieves were rearrested for car theft. Id.
140. ANDREW J.R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE
QUESTION 3 (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 2004).
141. Id. at 11.
142. R. Karl Hanson, Kelley E. Morton & Andrew J.R. Harris, Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk:
What We Know and What We Need to Know, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 154, 155 (2003) [hereinafter
Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk] (“The five-year recidivism rate was 14% . . . the 10-year recidivism
rate was 20%.”).
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he will do so.143
A similar, though steeper, downward trend is evident in the DOJ data,
which indicate that sex offenders released in the United States were
most likely to be arrested in the first year, and the rate declined every
subsequent year.144 Of the 513 sex offenders who were rearrested: 40%
(205) were rearrested in the first year, 34% (174) in the second, and
26% (133) in the third. Of the 156 rapists who recidivated (i.e., were
arrested for a new sex crime within three years of release): 40% (62)
recidivated within the first year, 34% (53) in the second, and 26% (41)
in the third. With child molesters, the rates dropped even more quickly.
Of the 219 child molesters who were arrested for a new sex crime
against a child within three years of release: 43% (94) were arrested in
the first year, 33% (72) in the second, and 24% (53) in the third.
If this same downward trend were to continue, then the recidivism
rate of sex offenders would reach 11% between ten and fifteen years
after release from prison. (The number of additional rearrests would
drop to a negligible level at that time.) Similarly, the recidivism rate of
child molesters would reach 9% between ten and fifteen years after
release from prison. Again, the number of additional re-arrests would
drop to a negligible level at this time.145
D. The Effect of Age on Recidivism
Most sex offenders do not recidivate, and like other types of
offenders, their risk of doing so decreases as they age. In 2002, R. Karl
Hanson used data from ten follow-up studies of adult male sex offenders
(combined sample of 4,673) to study the relationship between age and
sexual recidivism. He found that “[i]n the total sample, the recidivism
rate declined steadily with age.” Furthermore, “[t]he association was
linear.”146
Interestingly, Hanson found significant differences among offender
groups. Rapists were younger than other types of sex offenders.147
Almost half were younger than 30, and their risk of recidivating dropped
steadily with age, with no one reoffending over age 60.148 The risk of
recidivating for extra-familial child molesters rose from ages 18 to 25
143. Id. at 155.
144. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 125, at 16.
145. For a detailed discussion of these computations, see Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling the
Sexually Violent Predator: Continued Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, app. C
(2011).
146. R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual Offenders, 17 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1053 (2002).
147. Id. at 1056.
148. Id. at 1054.
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and then began dropping at a slow but continuous rate until the age of
50, when it declined dramatically.149 Hanson found that, although it
continued to drop, the highest recidivism rate occurred in extra-familial
child molesters between the ages of 25 and 35.150 Hanson found that
incest offenders presented significantly lower recidivism rates overall
and that they declined steadily with the offender’s age. The highest
recidivism rate for incest offenders occurred between the ages of 18 and
24.151
Other researchers have reported similar results,152 even when
analyzing the age effect on a sample of offenders with a higher
recidivism rate than the general prison population.153
E. The Effectiveness of Treatment
Compounding concern about recidivism rates is a sense of
helplessness born from the belief that sexual predators are impervious to
treatment. Although such a belief made sense in the past, treatment has
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Howard E. Barbaree et al., Aging Versus Stable Enduring Traits as Explanatory
Constructs in Sex Offender Recidivism: Partitioning Actuarial Prediction into Conceptually Meaningful
Components, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 443, 443 (2009) (“A large body of evidence has recently
accumulated indicating that recidivism in sex offenders decreases with the age of the offender at the
time of his release . . . .”); Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The “Aging”
Offender and the Prediction of Reoffending in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26 JUST. Q. 827, 851
(2009) (finding that the risk of recidivism decreases with age); Patrick Lussier et al., Criminal
Trajectories of Adult Sex Offenders and the Age Effect: Examining the Dynamic Aspect of Offending in
Adulthood, 20 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 147, 164 (2010) (offering “several explanations as to why older
sex offenders represent a lower risk of recidivism”); Richard Wollert et al., Recent Research (n = 9,305)
Underscores the Importance of Using Age-Stratified Actuarial Tables in Sex Offender Risk Assessments,
22 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 471, 484 (2010) (concluding that “evaluators should report
recidivism estimates from age-stratified or equivalent tables when they are assessing sexual recidivism
risk, particularly when evaluating the aging sex offender”).
153. In 2007, Prentky and Lee looked at the age effect on a cohort of 136 rapists and 115 child
molesters who had been civilly committed to a Massachusetts prison and were then followed for twentyfive years. They found that with rapists, recidivism dropped linearly as a function of age. With child
molesters, however, they found that recidivism increased from age 20 to age 40 and then declined
slightly at age 50 and significantly at age 60. Robert Alan Prentky & Austin F.S. Lee, Effect of Age-atRelease on Long Term Sexual Re-Offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SEXUAL
ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT, 43, 53 (2007). As Prentky and Lee point out, their sample is statistically
small and included offenders with a higher base rate of recidivism than those drawn from the general
prison population.
Although this latter consideration must be regarded as a limitation in terms of
generalizability, it may also be seen as strength of the study. Presumably, using a higher
risk sample is a more severe test of the age-crime hypothesis, providing confirmatory
support for the rapists and ‘amplifying’ or exaggerating the quadratic blip in Hanson’s
(2002) data for child molesters.
Id. at 58.
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improved significantly since the 1970s.154 For instance, a 2001 study by
Beech, Erikson, Friendship, and Ditchfield and a 2002 study by
Marques, Day, Wiederanders, and Nelson both found that progress in
sex offender treatment was significantly correlated with lowered
recidivism. Hanson, Gordon, Harris, Marques, Murphy, Quinsey, and
Seto (Hanson et al.) conducted a meta-analysis of 43 studies involving
more than 9,000 offenders in which they found that current cognitivebehavioral treatments reduced sexual recidivism by 43%.155 A metaanalysis including eighty studies that followed over 22,000 individuals
concluded that some treatments do have positive and significant effects
on recidivism. The most effective is surgical or chemical castration, in
part because willingness to undergo it bespeaks the perpetrator’s strong
incentive to change his behavior.156 Another meta-analysis of 9,000
offenders in forty-three studies found that treatment lowered sexoffender recidivism from 17.3 to 9.9%, a drop of 43%.157
Interestingly, Hanson et al. found that refusal to participate in
treatment was not associated with higher recidivism for sex offenses as
compared with those who participated in treatment.158 Refusal was
associated with higher general recidivism (i.e., recidivism for any
crime).159 Dropping out after treatment began, however, was correlated

154. R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the
Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE 169, 188 (2002).
155. Id. at 186–187.
156. See Anthony Beech & Hannah Ford, The Relationship Between Risk, Deviance, Treatment
Outcome and Sexual Reconviction in a Sample of Child Sexual Abusers Completing Residential
Treatment for their Offending, 12 PSYCH., CRIME & L. 685 (2006) (finding that none of the high
risk/high deviance men who left the residential treatment program having responded to treatment had
been reconvicted of a sexual offense during the follow-up period); Friedrich Lösel & Martin Schmucker,
The Effectiveness of Treatment for Sexual Offenders: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 117, 134–35 (2005) (considering psychological, chemical, and surgical
treatments for perpetrators and finding cognitive behavioral and hormonal treatment as the most
promising). See also Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 85, at 1159 (“On average, sexual offenders
who attend treatment are less likely to recidivate than are comparison groups, but it is easy to locate
well-controlled studies that find no effect for sexual offender treatment.”); Mario J. Scalora & Calvin
Garbin, A Multivariate Analysis of Sex Offender Recidivism, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY &
COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 309, 314 (2003) (finding that “treated child molesters were significantly
less likely to reoffend compared to their untreated counterparts”). But see Janice K. Marques et al.,
Effects of a Relapse Prevention Program on Sexual Recidivism: Final Results From California’s Sex
Offender Treatment and Evaluation Project (SOTEP), 17 SEXUAL ABUSE 79 (2005) (finding that
inpatient relapse prevention treatment had no significant effect on reoffending over an eight-year follow
up period as compared to a control group who received no treatment; however, closer examination
found that those who met the program’s treatment goals had a lower recidivism rate than those who did
not).
157. Hanson et al., supra note 154, at 187. It also lowered general recidivism from 51% to 32%.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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with a higher rate of sexual recidivism.160
Not all experts agree on the effectiveness of treatment. Levenson and
D’Amora reviewed various studies on the efficacy and found that
“although the research is not unequivocal, there is evidence to believe
that treatment can be helpful for many sex offenders.”161 Harris et al.,
actually found that sex offender treatment was non-significantly
associated with increased recidivism.162
F. The Effect of Gender
In a recent meta-analysis of ten studies, Cortoni, Hanson, and Coache
found that women sex offenders had a very low sexual recidivism
rate.163 They followed 2,416 female sex offenders and found that
between 1% to 3% recidivated sexually.164 They concluded, “These
results provide clear evidence that female sexual offenders, once they
have been detected and sanctioned by the criminal justice system, tend
not to reengage in sexually offending behavior.”165 They added that, at
this point, “The risk factors for sexual recidivism among females are
unknown . . . .”166
G. Additional Factors Related to Recidivism
“No single risk factor is sufficient to predict whether a particular
offender will reoffend or not.”167 Hanson and Morton-Bourgon
conducted a meta-analysis of eighty-two studies and found that the two
strongest predictors of sexual recidivism were sexual deviancy168 and
antisocial orientation.169 They also found that factors such as “sexual
preoccupations, lifestyle/impulsivity, pro-offending attitudes, and

160. Id. at 186–87.
161. Jill S. Levenson & David A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence,
18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 179 (2007).
162. Grant T. Harris et al., A Multisite Comparison of Actuarial Risk Instruments for Sex
Offenders, 15 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 413 (2003).
163. Franca Cortoni et al., The Recidivism Rates of Female Sexual Offenders Are Low: A MetaAnalysis, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE 387 (2010).
164. Id. at 394.
165. Id. at 396.
166. Id. at 398.
167. Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 158.
168. Deviant sexual interest means that a person has an enduring attraction to illegal sexual acts
(such as sex with a child) or highly unusual sources of arousal (such as fetishism). Hanson & MortonBourgnon, supra note 85, at 1154–57.
169. Antisocial orientation refers to antisocial personality, antisocial traits, and a history of
violating rules. Id. at 1157.
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intimacy deficits” also influenced recidivism.170 In an earlier study,
Hanson and Bussière found the following factors to be slightly
predictive of sexual recidivism: the existence of prior sexual offenses,
the fact that victim was a male, that the victim was a stranger, that the
victim was extra-familial, and that he began offending at an early age.171
Interestingly, Hanson and Bussière found that the following were not
associated with recidivism: the degree of sexual contact, the extent of
force used, and the infliction of injury to the victim.172 They also found
that low remorse, low victim empathy, and denial were unrelated to
sexual recidivism.173
H. Recidivism Rates for Sex Abuse of Children
As discussed above, the DOJ found that 3.3% of child molesters were
rearrested for a new sex crime against a child within three years of
release from prison. Recidivism in child molesters is based on a number
of factors: “The more deviant the sexual practices of the offender; the
younger the abused child; the more sociopathic or antisocial personality
traits displayed; the greater the treatment noncompliance; and the
greater the number of paraphilic interests reported by the offender, the
higher the likelihood of reoffense.”174 As opposed to rapists, child
molesters reported less socially deviant behavior over their lifetime, and
they started criminal activity later in life.175
In addition, the recidivism rate varies significantly according to the
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.176 Child molesters
who abuse children within their own family (such as children,
stepchildren, and nieces and nephews) have the lowest recidivism
rates.177 “Among child molesters, those most likely to sexually

170. Id. at 1159.
171. Hanson & Bussière, supra note 126, at 351–52.
172. Id. at 351.
173. Id. at 357.
174. Hall & Hall, supra note 58, at 467.
175. Patrick Lussier, Marc LeBlanc & Jean Proulx, The Generality of Criminal Behavior: A
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Criminal Activity of Sex Offenders in Adulthood, 33 J. CRIM. JUST.
177, 186 (2005).
176. See Berliner, supra note 53, at 1209 (“Recidivism rates, however, vary dramatically
depending on the subpopulation of interest. Some groups of sex offenders, such as men who commit
incest, are at quite low risk to reoffend, while others, for example those with multiple prior sex offense
convictions, are at relatively high risk to reoffend.”).
177. See Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 155–156; David Greenberg et al.,
Recidivism of Child Molesters: A Study of Victim Relationship with the Perpetrator, 24 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1485 (2000) (“A larger portion of men (16.2%) who sexually offended against children who
were acquaintances, were charged with a new sexual offense than men who sexually offended against
biological (4.8%) or their stepchildren (5.1%).”).
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recidivate are those who offended against unrelated boy victims,
followed by those who offended against unrelated girl victims and,
finally, incest offenders.”178 A study of sex offenders released from
Arizona prisons found that 14% of extrafamilial child molesters were
charged with a new sexual offense within five years, compared to 11%
of incest child molesters.179 Another study found that 16.2% of men
who sexually offended against acquaintances recidivated as compared
with 5.1% who had offended against their stepchildren and 4.8% of
those who had offended against their biological children.180
I. Recidivism Rates for Rape
As discussed above, the DOJ found that 2.5% of rapists were
rearrested for a rape within three years of release from prison. Several
studies suggest that rapists are more similar to the general criminal
population than are child molesters. The results of one study suggest
that “the prediction of recidivism for rapists may not differ substantially
from that for general offenders . . . . [R]apists may be characterized by
manifesting a general pattern of antisocial deviance that persists over
time—their sexual offenses may merely be one more manifestation of
their deviant behavior.”181 Indeed, one meta-analysis found that
although rapists and child molesters had similar recidivism rates,
“[r]apists . . . [were] much more likely than child molesters to recidivate
with a nonsexual violent offense.”182 The behavior of rapists was
consistent with theories that explain criminal behavior as caused by lack
of self-control and inability to resist deviant opportunities and could be
explained the same way as the behavior of other types of criminals.183
J. An Important Caveat Regarding Underreporting
The DOJ study cited above reports the number of sex offenders who
were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years of release from

178. Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 155–156.
179. Darci L. Bartosh et al., Differences in the Predictive Validity of Actuarial Risk Assessments
in Relation to Sex Offender Type, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 422, 429
tbl.2 (2003) (both extrafamilial and incest molesters had around a 45% general recidivism rate for any
type of crime).
180. See Greenberg et al., supra note 177.
181. Genevieve Parent, Jean-Pierre Guay & Raymond A. Knight, An Assessment of Long-Term
Risk of Recidivism by Adult Sex Offenders: One Size Doesn’t Fit All, 38 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 188, 204
(2011) (studying recidivism rates of sex offenders—child molesters, rapists, and those who had
committed both offenses—to determine accuracy of recidivism prediction models).
182. Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 155 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
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prison; however, these numbers undoubtedly understate the actual
recidivism rate in two ways. First, there may be errors in reporting the
data. The arresting police agency may not have sent all of the
appropriate records to the agency gathering data, or the data may be
misreported.184 Second, and more significantly, the DOJ has no way of
considering crimes that law enforcement did not detect. Many scholars
contend that the rate of underreporting in sex cases is high.185
Sex crimes may not be reported to law enforcement because, when
they involve family members or friends, victims may not want to risk
incriminating someone they care about or rely upon.186 In addition, a
victim may be embarrassed or blame herself for what occurred.187 The
victim may be distrustful of the police or the court system or fear
reprisal or the possible repercussions to her assailant.188 Alternatively,
the victim may not realize that what happened was a crime. A child
victim might have told a parent or guardian who did not take the
allegation seriously, especially if the accused is a close family member

184. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 116, at 58.
185. Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and
Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J.COUNSELING & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 162, 162–70 (1988); John J. Sloan III et al., Assessing the Student Right to Know and Campus
Security Act of 1990: An Analysis of the Victim Reporting Practices of College and University Students,
43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 148, 148–68 (1997); Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape
Reporting After Reforms: Have Times Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150 (2005);
Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results from a
National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 6 (2003); Lita Furby et al., Sex
Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCH. BULL. 3, 9 (1989). For instance, Sloan III et al. conducted
a national study of college students in which they found that only 22% of rapes and 17% of sexual
assaults were reported to local law enforcement, campus police, or security or other authorities. Sloan
III et al., supra, at 148–68.
186. See Fisher et al., supra note 185, at 10–12; see also Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 161,
at 178.
187. See Amy L. Brown & Maria Testa, Social Influences on Judgments of Rape Victims: The
Role of the Negative and Positive Social Reactions of Others, 58 SEX ROLES 490 (2008); Bonnie L. Katz
& Martha R. Burt, Self Blame in Recovery from Rape: Help or Hindrance, in ANN WOLBERT BURGESS
ED., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT II, 345–58 (1998); Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Reacting to
Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 202,
210 (2009).
188. Meghan Casey, Refugee Women As Cultural Others: Constructing Social Group and Nexus
For FGM, Sex Trafficking, and Domestic Violence Asylum Claims in the United States, 10 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 981, 1035 n.259 (2012) (“Reasons for not informing the police include the victims’ belief
that their victimization was a private or personal matter, fear of retaliation, and feeling that the police
would not be able to help them.”); BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE
WOMEN 8 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf (reporting that reasons for
college women not reporting rapes included “not wanting family or other people to know about the
incident, lack of proof the incident happened, fear of reprisal by the assailant, fear of being treated with
hostility by the police, and anticipation that the police would not believe the incident was serious
enough and/or would not want to be bothered with the incident”).
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or trusted friend.189
In 2006, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimated that 41.4%
of all forcible rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the police.190
In 2005, the estimate was that 45.2% of all forcible rapes and 30.2% of
all sexual assaults were reported.191 In 2004, 56.8% of all forcible rapes
and 25.7% of all sexual assaults were reported.192
Even if underreporting is high, however, it does not necessarily
diminish the accuracy of the recidivism studies cited above. By
definition, recidivism studies consider only previously convicted sex
offenders because they examine whether a person continues to reoffend
after he has been convicted of a sex crime. For underreporting studies to
discredit the accuracy of recidivism studies, they would have to be
focused on whether victims report crimes committed by previously
convicted offenders. It is entirely possible that a significant part of the
high underreporting rate reflects victims who fail to report crimes
committed by first-time sex offenders or individuals who have offended
before but have never been caught.
One way of surmising whether sex crimes by convicted sex offenders
are underreported relative to those committed by first-time or previously
unconvicted offenders is to consider the proportion of sex-crime arrests
of individuals who were not previously convicted of a sex offense as
compared with those who were. The 2003 Department of Justice study
found that 513 released sex offenders were arrested for a new sex crime
189. See Erin Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line: Sexual Abuse and Whether Retroactive
Application of Civil Statutes of Limitation are Legal, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL. 391, 407–08
(“First, the child has to recognize what is happening is wrong. Second, the victim needs to be willing to
come forward and tell someone about the abuse before any action can proceed, and unfortunately, many
children are ashamed and embarrassed about the sexual abuse and, thus, are hindered from coming
forward. Third, the child needs to be honestly believed by someone who can do something.”).
190. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2006 (2007). Although changes were
made to the NCVS in 2006 that prevent comparison of national level estimates from previous years, it is
still worth reporting prior findings. Id. at 1.
191. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2005 Statistical Tables
tbl.91 (2006).
192. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004
STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.91 (2006). The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) estimates crime
victimization across the United States using a nationally representative sample of households. In 2006,
76,000 households and 135,300 individuals ages 12 years and above were interviewed by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) then used these interviews to estimate the
extent of crime victimization. Reporting rates were similar for the three-year period studied in the 2003
Department of Justice report. In 1994, 36.1% of forcible rapes and 40.7% of sexual assaults were
reported to the police. Id., 1994 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.91 (1997). In 1995, 35.3% of forcible rapes
and 27.9% of sexual assaults were reported to the police. Id., 1995 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.91 (2000).
In 1996, 40.6% of forcible rapes and 24.5% of sexual assaults were reported to the police. Id., 1997
STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.91 (2000). In 1997, 46.4% of all forcible rapes were reported to the police,
and 9.3% of all attempted rapes were reported to the police. Id. The strikingly low percentage of those
reporting sexual assaults may be explained by the fact that the estimate was made based on
approximately ten or fewer sample cases.
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as compared with 3,328 released non-sex offenders arrested for a new
sex crime.193 Among released individuals arrested for sex crimes, 86.5%
had not been convicted of a prior sex offense.194 These data suggest that
more sex crimes are actually being committed by those who have not
been previously arrested for a sex crime than by those who have
experienced a previous arrest. Unless there is some reason to think that
victims are less likely to report a crime against a repeat offender, it
makes sense to think that underreporting is disproportionately
benefitting those who have never offended before or at least never
before been caught.
Indeed, it would make sense that underreporting would be less likely
when the alleged perpetrator is a known sex offender. It seems less
likely that a victim would fail to report if the alleged perpetrator is
already branded as a sex-crime perpetrator. Not all former convicted
sex offenders will have their histories known, but with mandatory
registration of convicted sex offenders and the availability of criminal
records on the internet, such personal history is more likely to be known
that in previous generations. The Jacob Wetterling Act requires that sex
offenders register their addresses with the local police station, and
Megan’s Law requires that this information be made available to the
public.195 Furthermore, when sex offenders are released from custody,
they often receive strict parole or probation supervision. If one of these
individuals committed a sex crime, it seems more likely that a victim’s
report would be taken seriously, which in turn would make the victim
more likely to report. Furthermore, victims may be more willing to
report a crime from a known perpetrator because they think he deserves
to be punished and prevented from continuing to violate others.
V. RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY TO
PREDICT WHO WILL OFFEND IN THE FUTURE
In deciding whether to admit propensity evidence, judges must
193. A few advocates of Rules 413–414 have used this fact to argue that the recidivism rate for
sex crimes is particularly high. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710, 716 n.8 (Pa.
2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)) (“When convicted sex offenders reenter
society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or
sexual assault.”); Kahn, supra note 33, at 652–53 (“Another distinguishing factor of sex crimes is the
high recidivism rates among sex offenders. According to a 2003 Department of Justice report, sex
offenders were rearrested for new sex crimes within three years of release at a rate four times greater
than other released convicts. Department of Justice data concluded that ‘[r]eleased rapists were 10.5
times as likely as non-rapists to be arrested for rape’ and that people convicted of sexual assault were
‘7.5 times as likely as those convicted of other crimes to be arrested for a new sexual assault.’”).
194. DOJ, supra note 105, at 1.
195. See U.S Dep’t of Justice, Solutions for Safer Communities (2011), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/02ajwactcontents.html.
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determine whether such evidence is substantially more unfairly
prejudicial than it is probative. Such an evaluation begs an important
question: can judges accurately assess the probative value of uncharged
conduct? Practically, we suspect the answer is no.
In 1978, a task force of the American Psychological Association
reported:
It does appear from reading the research that the validity of psychological
predictions of dangerous behavior, at least in the sentencing and release
situation . . . is extremely poor, so poor that one could oppose their use on
the strictly empirical grounds that psychologists are not professionally
competent to make such judgments.196

In a clinical assessment, forensic psychologists and psychiatrists
conduct interviews, review case files, perform psychological testing, and
then use that information as the basis for a clinical opinion on whether a
person is likely to reoffend.197 Although there is some disagreement
regarding whether clinicians can accurately predict future
dangerousness,198 most experts believe that they cannot.199 Studies have
shown that clinical predictions are not much more accurate than
chance.200
One potential problem is that factors that would seem to be intuitively
linked to risk are not. For example, denial of the charges and low
treatment motivation are not linked to recidivism.201 Nor are general
psychological problems,202 alcohol abuse, or the accused’s being abused
as a child predictors for reoffending.203 Factors related to the crime, like
low empathy for the victim and degree of sexual contact, are also
unassociated with recidivism.204

196. American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in
the Criminal Justice System. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978).
197. R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCH. PUB.
POL. & L. 50, 54 (1998).
198. See Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCH.,
PUB. POL. & L. 409 (2001).
199. Hanson, supra note 197; JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR (1982); Vernon L. Quinsey & Rudolf Ambtman, Variables Affecting Psychiatrists’ and
Teachers’ Assessments of the Dangerousness of Mentally Ill Offenders, 47 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 353 (1979); Vernon L. Quinsey & Anne Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients:
Actuarial and Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 143 (1986).
200. Hanson & Bussière, supra note 126, at 356. r =.10 for sexual recidivism. In a meta-analysis
of ten studies (total sample size = 1,453) that evaluated the predictive accuracy of clinical assessment in
predicting sexual recidivism, the average correlation between clinical prediction of sex-offender
recidivism and actual recidivism was just .10. Hanson, supra note 197, at 54.
201. Hanson & Bussière, supra note 126, at 348–62.
202. Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 158.
203. Hanson, supra note 197, at 56; Hanson & Bussière, supra note 126, at 353.
204. Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk, supra note 142, at 158.
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If trained psychologists who have actually spoken at length with their
patients cannot predict recidivism, it is difficult to understand how a
judge would be able to do so after reading a police or probation
report.205 It is even harder to understand why a legal rule would allow
such evidence before the jury, given the many ways that jurors will
overvalue and distort it (not to mention the vast prejudice such evidence
engenders, which is not the subject of this Article).
Nevertheless, the rules of evidence clearly delegate the job of
assessing the probative value of prior bad acts to the trial judge. The
legislative history indicates that in applying the Rule 403 balance to
Rules 413–414, in the vast majority of cases, the judge should find
evidence of prior sexual misconduct presumptively probative.206 In
essence, Congress has declared how the Rule 403 balance must
normally come out.207 Whether this is a desirable or even constitutional
allocation of power between Congress and the courts is highly
questionable.208 In our opinion, courts have been overly deferential to
the legislative assessment that prior bad acts are particularly probative in
sex crimes. The determination of the balance between probative value
205. G. Adam Cossey, A Dangerous Leap: The Admission of Prior Offenses in Sexual-Assault
and Child-Molestation Cases in Arkansas, 61 ARK. L. REV. 107, 122 (“Psychological science has, in
fact, had a very difficult time predicting the risk of sexual offenders reoffending. If scientists have had
this much trouble, just how did the Arkansas courts make this determination?”).
206. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 403 should
be used infrequently, reflecting Congress’ legislative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be
admitted.”); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying underlying legislative
judgment that probative value of Rule 413 evidence “is normally not outweighed by any risk of
prejudice or other adverse effects”); 140 CONG. REC. 23603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of
principal House sponsor, Rep. Molinari) (“To implement the legislative intent, the courts must liberally
construe these rules to provide the basis for a fully informed decision of sexual assault and child
molestation cases, including assessment of the defendant’s propensities and questions of probability in
light of the defendant’s past conduct.”).
207. There is a presumption in favor of admissibility under these rules based on “the strong
legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible.” United
States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767,
769 (8th Cir. 1997)); State v. Monahan, 2012 WL 2499662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the
“probative value of Defendant’s aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged crimes”); see also
United States v. Donaldson, 2012 WL 2317343, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (“While this Court recognizes
the inherent potential prejudice of this type of evidence, it is important to note that the Second Circuit
has repeatedly recognized that in sexual assault and child molestation cases, the presumption is that
evidence of prior acts of sexual assault or child molestation is relevant and probative, and that its
probative value is normally not outweighed by any risk of prejudice.”).
208. For a critique of this approach, see Eileen Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 856, 877–80 (2002) (criticizing the Third Circuit in Johnson v. Elk
Lake School District, 283 F.3d 138, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2002), for using David Karp’s speech,
memorialized later in a law review article, as legislative history in interpreting Rule 415, the civil analog
to Rules 414–415); Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1557–59 (2005); Rosanna Cavallaro, Federal Rules of
Evidence 413–415 and the Struggle for Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31
(2007).
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and prejudice is, by its very nature, a contextualized determination made
on a case-by-case basis. If indeed all prior sex misconduct were
admissible, the Rule 403 balance would not be necessary; everything
would come in. In fact, however, all courts that have considered the
question have determined that the Rule 403 balance is essential to due
process. Without a Rule 403 balance, Rules 413–414 would be rendered
unconstitutional.209 Therefore, the balance must have some content and
meaning.
Some jurisdictions have developed lists of factors to consider in
performing the Rule 403 balance.210 Generally, when courts find the
probative value of prior sexual misconduct low, it is because they focus
on the dissimilarities between the prior bad acts and the charged
conduct.211 Although questions of similarity are important in this
regard, courts must further refine and reinvigorate the weighing of
probative value. A sophisticated understanding of the factors that
actually affect recidivism rates cannot undo the poor policy and
scientific know-nothingness of the current rules. Nevertheless, it can
assist courts in wisely applying them to do the least injustice.
VI. WHAT SHOULD JUDGES CONSIDER IN DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF PROPENSITY EVIDENCE?
This Article has challenged the assumption that propensity evidence
in sex cases is particularly probative. Despite the concerns raised here
about the false premises based on mistaken notions of recidivism, and
raised elsewhere about due process and basic fairness, we realize that
Rules 413–414 and their state analogs are popular and unlikely to be
revised any time soon.212 In light of that, we offer some specific advice
to district court judges on how, while respecting the legislative mandate,
they can nevertheless apply Rule 403 in light of the psychological and
criminological evidence we have presented. Our observations and
advice should also be particularly helpful in the state jurisdictions that
employ common-law rules allowing evidence of the accused’s
propensity in sex crimes.
As we have demonstrated, the recidivism rate for sex offenders is
209. See United States v. Enjady, 525 U.S. 887 (1998); Orenstein, supra note 208.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2006).
211. United States v. Meacham, 115 F3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (admitting a thirty year-oldprior act of sexual misconduct, where prosecutor argued that “‘[p]eople that have an aberrant sexual
behavior, such as the defendant does, you don’t get over that . . . . [W]ith things like sexual orientation
towards children, a sexual interest in children, that doesn’t change unless you get some intervention”’).
212. See Orenstein, supra note 208 (noting that these rules are here to stay and dividing
suggestions for improvement into those that Congress should do, but will not, and those that courts can
do).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/1

38

Lave and Orenstein: Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admis

2013]

EMPIRICAL FALLACIES OF EVIDENCE LAW

833

actually lower than for many other crimes in which the propensity rule
does not apply. Karl Hanson, probably the most widely cited scholar on
sex-offender recidivism, wrote, “If few offenders recidivate, as is often
the case in sexual offender outcome studies, then the simplest way to
maximize the percentage correctly classified is to predict that no one
will reoffend.”213 Thus, despite the license offered by Rules 413–414
and their state analogs, judges should evaluate the probative value of
past sex crimes in current cases with nuance and care. Instead of just
assuming that a person offended before and so he did it again, judges
should start their inquiry with the understanding that most offenders do
not in fact recidivate. Information in this article could assist the court in
recalibrating the presumed high probative value of prior sex crimes. In
light of this more sophisticated notion of probative value and a casespecific assessment of unfair prejudice, judges should feel empowered
to reject some evidence admitted under these rules.
A. Length of Time Since Prior Misconduct
Perhaps the most important contribution we can make to judges’
assessments of probative value is to educate the judiciary on the effect
of lapse of time on recidivism. Logically, one can assume that the
longer the span between past conduct and current charges, the less
valuable the prior bad act is in assessing current conduct. (Ironically,
however, at least one court actually used the length of time to argue that
the prior act was more probative because the deviance was so longstanding).214 Some federal courts do use length of time as a factor that
diminishes probative value.215 Some state courts that have adopted Rule
413–414 analogs have inserted a time requirement.216 However, many
courts do not sufficiently value the passage of time as a factor. Some
courts note that “[t]he legislative history of Rule 414 reveals that
Congress meant its temporal scope to be broad, allowing the court to
admit evidence of Rule 414 acts that occurred more than 20 years before
trial.”217 As the courts repeatedly explain, “Remoteness in time,

213. Hanson, supra note 197, at 53.
214. See People v. Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 108 (Ct. App. 2001).
215. Seymour, 468 F.3d at 385–86; see also United States v, Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir.
2007) (listing as one factor “the temporal proximity between the two crimes”); United States v. Guardia,
135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (including “closeness in time of the prior acts to the charged acts”
as a factor in the Rule 403 balance).
216. Cf. State v. Gresham, 269 P.3d 207 (Wash. 2012) (listing “[t]he closeness in time of the prior
acts to the acts charged” as a factor in conducting the Rule 403 balance).
217. United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir, 1997); see also 140 CONG. REC. 23603
(daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (quoted in part in Gabe, 237 F.3d at 960 n.4)
(“[A]s a practical matter, evidence of other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly
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especially when the prior crime was substantially similar, does not
render the conviction inadmissible.”218 Prior acts from twenty or even
thirty years before the current charges are admitted under Rules 413–
414.219
A time limitation is already in the rules of character evidence
regarding criminal convictions of witnesses (which includes the
accused). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), a prior crime is not
admissible to impeach a witness if more than ten years have elapsed
since the date of conviction220 or confinement221 (whichever is longer)
unless the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial
effect.222 Consequently, except in exceptional circumstances, crimes
over ten years old are not admitted to impeach a witness’ character.
Unfortunately, such a sensible limitation was not built into Rules 413–
414—even though one of their sponsors, Senator Robert Dole, did
express his opinion that any prior act over ten years old would not be
generally admissible under the Rules.223
In light of the facts that the risk of recidivating drops over time, and
that the longer a person remains in the community without offending,
the less likely he is to reoffend, judges should be highly skeptical of the
probative value of sex crimes from long ago. Accordingly, a ten-year
time lag should be deemed to undermine significantly the probative
value of prior sexual misconduct. Even though Rules 413–414 do not

admitted, notwithstanding very substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or
offenses.”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2001) (“When Rule 414 was enacted,
Congress expressly rejected imposing any time limit on prior sex offense evidence.”).
218. United States v. Levinson, 2011 WL 1102841, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2011). This is particularly
true where the accused has been incarcerated and has had little opportunity to recidivate. United States
v. Merz, 396 Fed.App’x 838, 843 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that for many of the thirteen years between
offenses the accused was in prison).
219. For examples of judges admitting propensity evidence that is over ten years old, see United
States v. Carino, 368 Fed. App’x 929 (11th Cir. 2010) (evidence of molestation 32 years before trial
properly admitted); United States v. Benally, 500 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming admission of
rape of sister-in-law forty years before charged offense under Rule 414); United States v. Drewry, 365
F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding “[s]ufficient factual similarity” between twenty-five-year-old
uncharged child molestation and the charged offense permitted admission of evidence “that might
otherwise be inadmissible due to staleness”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959–60 (8th Cir.
2001) (upholding admission of sexual molestation committed twenty years before charged offenses
where prior acts were “almost identical” to charged crimes); see also Orenstein, supra note 208, at 1495
n.23.
220. United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992).
221. United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1992).
222. FED. R. EVID 609(b). There is a clear presumption against admitting remote character
evidence. See United States v. Estes, 994 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Avants,
367 F.3d 433, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Privett, 68 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1995).
223. In discussing the value of prior sexual misconduct Senator Dole stated that “[i]f it had not
happened for 10 years, it probably would not have any value.” 139 CONG. REC. 27549 (daily ed. Nov.
4, 1993).
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themselves contain a time limit such as the one included in Rule 609,
judges employing their discretion should generally consider prior sex
crimes older than ten years as lacking sufficient probative value.
B. Type of Crime
The risk of recidivating differs depending on the specific sex crime.
Judges should be especially reluctant to admit propensity evidence
against accused incest offenders because their risk of recidivating is
low,224 and the unfair prejudice may be especially high given juror
revulsion at incest, particularly when the victim is a child. Such cases
may be emotionally difficult for judges as well.
C. Age of Offender
The significance of age in recidivating cannot be underestimated.
The older the accused rapist or child molester, the more wary judges
should be of admitting propensity evidence. For those accused of
committing child molestation, judges should be especially cautious in
admitting propensity evidence as the accused reaches the age of 50 and
above. Judges should be aware that rapists are younger than other types
of sex offenders, and as they age, their risk of recidivating steadily
declines. On the other hand, we acknowledge that if recidivism rates are
deemed a fair proxy for probative value,225 judges should consider the
increased risk of recidivating for incest offenders between the ages of 18
and 24 as enhancing the probative value of such prior bad acts.
D. Gender of the Offender
Women have a very low recidivism rate, and experts do not know
which factors are predictive of reoffending. In light of that, one could
counsel that judges should exercise extreme caution in admitting
propensity evidence against women. We recognize, however, that
relying on gender exclusively to diminish probative value would raise
the risk of discrimination and equal protection violations.

224. In one study, Hanson found that incest offenders had a recidivism rate of 8.4% as compared
with 17.1% for rapists and 19.5% for extra-familial child molesters. Hanson, supra note 146, at 1053.
225. For many reasons we resist the idea that it is, but we are trying to stay within the confines of
the debate and the limits of what trial judges can practically accomplish with their discretion under Rule
403.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The propensity rules are premised on the belief that sex offenders are
a discrete group of deviants who will continue to reoffend no matter
what. This view, however, is not supported by most existing
psychological and criminological research. The recidivism rate for sex
offenders is remarkably low, much lower than for crimes in which the
propensity ban remains in force. In addition, the longer a released
offender refrains from reoffending, the less likely he is to reoffend. In
part this is because as offenders age, they are less likely to reoffend.
Furthermore, studies show that not all sex offenders are the same.
Incest offenders (those who victimize their biological children as well as
those who violate their stepchildren) have much lower recidivism rates
than extra-familial child molesters. Yet, the evidence rules make no
such distinction among types of perpetrators who sexually abuse
children. Furthermore, not everyone who molests children is a
pedophile. Some men who commit sex crimes are attracted to children
but others choose a child for sexual gratification because the child is an
available easy target.
Abundant empirical evidence also contradicts the deviant, recidivist
image when applied to adult rape. In a 2004 DOJ study, 5% of rapists
were rearrested for a sex crime within three years of release from prison,
and just 2.5% were rearrested for rape.226 In addition, rapists were
younger than both extra-familial child molesters and incest offenders,
and their risk of recidivating dropped steadily as they aged.227
Sex offenders are not more likely than any other type of offender to
reoffend for the same crime. Although it is true that sex offenders are
more likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for a sex crime, they
are less likely than other offenders to recommit the crime for which they
were arrested. Indeed, the only group of offenders less deserving of the
propensity rationale is convicted killers.228
We do not contend that the propensity rationale never makes sense for
sex offenders and do not dispute that some offenders do reoffend
compulsively. The problem, however, is whether a judge would be able
to tell who those offenders are. As we show, clinicians are notoriously
inaccurate at predicting who will reoffend, and there is no reason to
think that judges will be any better.
Once a jury is faced with a bona fide rapist or child molester—that is,
someone who has been accused or convicted before—the temptation to
226. DOJ, supra note 105, at 28, 34.
227. Hanson, supra note 146, at 1056.
228. Just 1.2% were rearrested for homicide within three years after release from prison. LANGAN
& LEVIN, supra note 116, at 9.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/1

42

Lave and Orenstein: Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admis

2013]

EMPIRICAL FALLACIES OF EVIDENCE LAW

837

demonize that person and ignore the individual facts of the case are
enormous. This should provide all the more incentive for judges to
carefully and thoughtfully access the probative value of past sex crimes
in each individual case.
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